Aarón Álvarez-González
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996264 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aarón Álvarez-González |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aarón |
| FAMILY NAME | Álvarez-González |
| SIGNATURE | ÁLVAREZ-GONZÁLEZ A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6541-3784 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Isolating primitive emotional phenomenology in the ‘lab’ of fiction
There is an important debate in the philosophy of mind that has roots in the phenomenological tradition, namely: what are the primitive forms of consciousness, that is, what are the fundamental ingredients or aspects of consciousness. This paper wants to contribute to partially answering this general question by providing an answer to a required sub-question within this question: is emotional phenomenology fundamental? I will answer in the affirm…
Emotional Phenomenology
Emotions are taken by some authors as a kind of mental state epistemically akin to perception. However, unlike perceptual phenomenology, which allows being treated dogmatically, emotional phenomenology is puzzling in the following respect. When you feel an emotion, you feel an urge to act, you feel, among other things, your body’s action readiness. On the other hand, at least sometimes, you are aware that an emotion by itself is not a sufficient …
Bi-level evaluative epistemology
During the last decade we have witnessed a stagnated debate on the epistemic nature of emotion with two clear factions: those who defend that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. In this paper I propose a way out of that impasse. Based on Sosa’s distinction, I propose that there are animal and reflective evaluative knowledge in both of which emotion’s play a non-superfluous epistemic role. On the one hand, we can d…
An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology
Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight t…
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An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology
Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight t…
Emotional Phenomenology
Emotions are taken by some authors as a kind of mental state epistemically akin to perception. However, unlike perceptual phenomenology, which allows being treated dogmatically, emotional phenomenology is puzzling in the following respect. When you feel an emotion, you feel an urge to act, you feel, among other things, your body’s action readiness. On the other hand, at least sometimes, you are aware that an emotion by itself is not a sufficient …
Bi-level evaluative epistemology
During the last decade we have witnessed a stagnated debate on the epistemic nature of emotion with two clear factions: those who defend that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. In this paper I propose a way out of that impasse. Based on Sosa’s distinction, I propose that there are animal and reflective evaluative knowledge in both of which emotion’s play a non-superfluous epistemic role. On the one hand, we can d…
Isolating primitive emotional phenomenology in the ‘lab’ of fiction
There is an important debate in the philosophy of mind that has roots in the phenomenological tradition, namely: what are the primitive forms of consciousness, that is, what are the fundamental ingredients or aspects of consciousness. This paper wants to contribute to partially answering this general question by providing an answer to a required sub-question within this question: is emotional phenomenology fundamental? I will answer in the affirm…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work)