Frederik J Andersen
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996435 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Frederik J Andersen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Frederik J |
| FAMILY NAME | Andersen |
| SIGNATURE | ANDERSEN F J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Copenhagen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8191-9611 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
On the Epistemic Significance of Convergence in Ethical Theory
The major ethical theories—welfarist consequentialism, Kantianism, contractualism, common sense morality, and virtue ethics—appear to converge on the same practical advice in many situations. Such convergence seems epistemically significant. A natural thought would be that the convergence should assure us about the advice. However, what would be the rationale behind this—why should the convergence increase our assurance? That’s the main question …
Engel’s dilemma and the epistemic significance of logical disagreement
Hinge propositions—or simply “hinges”—are primitive certainties that we (must) presuppose to enable our entire belief systems. Recently there has been a lot of interest in hinge epistemology , which is a kind of epistemology that sets the notion of hinge at the center stage. This paper puts forward a dilemma levelled against hinge epistemologists. The dilemma is based on work by Pascal Engel ( International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 :…
Believing in default rules
This paper argues for the reasonableness of an inclusive conception of default reasoning. The inclusive conception allows untriggered default rules to influence beliefs: Since a default “from $$\varphi $$ , infer $$\psi $$ ” is a defeasible inference rule, it by default warrants a belief in the material implication $$\varphi \rightarrow \psi $$ , even if $$\varphi $$ is not believed. Such inferences are not allowed in standard default logic of th…
No prominent works on this page.
Engel’s dilemma and the epistemic significance of logical disagreement
Hinge propositions—or simply “hinges”—are primitive certainties that we (must) presuppose to enable our entire belief systems. Recently there has been a lot of interest in hinge epistemology , which is a kind of epistemology that sets the notion of hinge at the center stage. This paper puts forward a dilemma levelled against hinge epistemologists. The dilemma is based on work by Pascal Engel ( International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 :…
Believing in default rules
This paper argues for the reasonableness of an inclusive conception of default reasoning. The inclusive conception allows untriggered default rules to influence beliefs: Since a default “from $$\varphi $$ , infer $$\psi $$ ” is a defeasible inference rule, it by default warrants a belief in the material implication $$\varphi \rightarrow \psi $$ , even if $$\varphi $$ is not believed. Such inferences are not allowed in standard default logic of th…
On the Epistemic Significance of Convergence in Ethical Theory
The major ethical theories—welfarist consequentialism, Kantianism, contractualism, common sense morality, and virtue ethics—appear to converge on the same practical advice in many situations. Such convergence seems epistemically significant. A natural thought would be that the convergence should assure us about the advice. However, what would be the rationale behind this—why should the convergence increase our assurance? That’s the main question …
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Default logic (1 work)