Fred Keijzer
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996449 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fred Keijzer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fred |
| FAMILY NAME | Keijzer |
| SIGNATURE | KEIJZER F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7362-1770 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Phenomenological and existential contributions to the study of erectile dysfunction
The current medical approach to erectile dysfunction (ED) consists of physiological, psychological and social components. This paper proposes an additional framework for thinking about ED based on phenomenology, by focusing on the theory of sexual projection. This framework will be complementary to the current medical approach to ED. Our phenomenological analysis of ED provides philosophical depth and illuminates overlooked aspects in the study o…
Demarcating cognition: The cognitive life sciences
This paper criticizes the role of intuition-based ascriptions of cognition that are closely related to the ascription of mind. This practice hinders the explication of a clear and stable target domain for the cognitive sciences. To move forward, the proposal is to cut the notion of cognition free from such ascriptions and the intuition-based judgments that drive them. Instead, cognition is reinterpreted and developed as a scientific concept that …
Robotics, biological grounding and the Fregean tradition
Dynamic, embodied and situated cognition set up organism-environment interaction — agency for short — as the core of cognitive systems. Robotics became an important way to study this behavioral kernel of cognition. In this paper, we discuss the implications of what we call the biological grounding problem for robotic studies: Natural and artificial agents are hugely different and it will be necessary to articulate what must be replicated by artif…
Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics
In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises l…
Representation and Behavior
Keijzer provides a reconstruction of cognitive science's implicit representational explanation of behavior, which he calls Agent Theory (AT), the use of mind as a subpersonal mechanism of behavior. Representation is a fundamental concept within cognitive science. Most often, representations are interpreted as mental representations, theoretical entities that are the bearers of meaning and the source of intentionality. This approach views represen…
Recent Changes in the Concept of Cognition
Psychological theory is currently undergoing a change more profound than the `cognitive revolution' of the 1950s and 1960s. The present change involves a reconceptualization of the very concepts of cognition and mind. Cognitive science and cognitive psychology are turning away from the long dominant view of mind as an encapsulated, rational entity, dissociated from the body. In the emergent view the mind is seen as activity in an environment. Thi…
Demarcating cognition: The cognitive life sciences
This paper criticizes the role of intuition-based ascriptions of cognition that are closely related to the ascription of mind. This practice hinders the explication of a clear and stable target domain for the cognitive sciences. To move forward, the proposal is to cut the notion of cognition free from such ascriptions and the intuition-based judgments that drive them. Instead, cognition is reinterpreted and developed as a scientific concept that …
Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics
In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises l…
Recent Changes in the Concept of Cognition
Psychological theory is currently undergoing a change more profound than the `cognitive revolution' of the 1950s and 1960s. The present change involves a reconceptualization of the very concepts of cognition and mind. Cognitive science and cognitive psychology are turning away from the long dominant view of mind as an encapsulated, rational entity, dissociated from the body. In the emergent view the mind is seen as activity in an environment. Thi…
Representation and Behavior
Keijzer provides a reconstruction of cognitive science's implicit representational explanation of behavior, which he calls Agent Theory (AT), the use of mind as a subpersonal mechanism of behavior. Representation is a fundamental concept within cognitive science. Most often, representations are interpreted as mental representations, theoretical entities that are the bearers of meaning and the source of intentionality. This approach views represen…
Robotics, biological grounding and the Fregean tradition
Dynamic, embodied and situated cognition set up organism-environment interaction — agency for short — as the core of cognitive systems. Robotics became an important way to study this behavioral kernel of cognition. In this paper, we discuss the implications of what we call the biological grounding problem for robotic studies: Natural and artificial agents are hugely different and it will be necessary to articulate what must be replicated by artif…
Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics
In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises l…
Phenomenological and existential contributions to the study of erectile dysfunction
The current medical approach to erectile dysfunction (ED) consists of physiological, psychological and social components. This paper proposes an additional framework for thinking about ED based on phenomenology, by focusing on the theory of sexual projection. This framework will be complementary to the current medical approach to ED. Our phenomenological analysis of ED provides philosophical depth and illuminates overlooked aspects in the study o…
Demarcating cognition: The cognitive life sciences
This paper criticizes the role of intuition-based ascriptions of cognition that are closely related to the ascription of mind. This practice hinders the explication of a clear and stable target domain for the cognitive sciences. To move forward, the proposal is to cut the notion of cognition free from such ascriptions and the intuition-based judgments that drive them. Instead, cognition is reinterpreted and developed as a scientific concept that …
Cognition (6 works) · Cognitive science (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)