Martina Orlandi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996483 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martina Orlandi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martina |
| FAMILY NAME | Orlandi |
| SIGNATURE | ORLANDI M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Trent University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8078-8576 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Self-deception as normative violation
This paper defends an account of self-deception as a violation of the self-deceived’s own epistemic norms. I show that, compared to the most prominent version of a deflationary view of self-deception, a normative violation account does a better job of distinguishing self-deception from other similar biases, better captures the experiential tension characteristic of self-deception, and rescues the role of the self in self-deception
I knew all along’
Self-control in action and belief
Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the perhaps unexpected idea that self-control is in fact a transversal phenomenon which is applicable both to action and to belief. While there may be some differences in how self-control is manifested in the respective realms of action and belief, these d…
No prominent works on this page.
Self-control in action and belief
Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the perhaps unexpected idea that self-control is in fact a transversal phenomenon which is applicable both to action and to belief. While there may be some differences in how self-control is manifested in the respective realms of action and belief, these d…
I knew all along’
Self-deception as normative violation
This paper defends an account of self-deception as a violation of the self-deceived’s own epistemic norms. I show that, compared to the most prominent version of a deflationary view of self-deception, a normative violation account does a better job of distinguishing self-deception from other similar biases, better captures the experiential tension characteristic of self-deception, and rescues the role of the self in self-deception
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Deception (2 works) · Self-deception (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Behavioral Health and Interventions (1 work) · Chemistry (1 work)