Hannah Altehenger
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996516 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hannah Altehenger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hannah |
| FAMILY NAME | Altehenger |
| SIGNATURE | ALTEHENGER H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Konstanz |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7448-1984 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Narcissism, Entitlement, Responsibility
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the topic of moral responsibility for ‘non-ideal’ agents. And yet, one important type of ‘non-ideal’ agent, the narcissistic agent, has not received much attention. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap. My focus is on psychological entitlement, a feature that has been largely overlooked. I argue that this feature impairs narcissistic agents’ moral competence. This is because it both causes them to f…
The Hidden Values of Resisting Temptation
Self-control is generally regarded as a valuable capacity. However, the value of directly resisting temptations (a central part of our commonsense notion of self-control) has recently come under attack. Directly resisting temptations – as opposed to avoiding them – has been claimed to have several drawbacks, such as being an inefficient way of dealing with temptations, not contributing to an agent’s well-being, or even causing harmful “mental fra…
Too Much Self-Control
Although it seems commonsensical to say that one cannot merely have too little, but also too much self-control, the philosophical debate has largely focused on failures of self-control rather than its potential excesses. There are a few notable exceptions. But, by and large, the issue of having too much self-control has not received a lot of attention. This paper takes another careful look at the commonsensical position that it is possible to hav…
The Point of Blaming AI Systems
As Christian List has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasi…
The Mismatch Problem
Most of us have had the experience of resisting our currently strongest desire, for example, resisting the desire to eat another cookie when eating another cookie is what we most want to do. The puzzle of synchronic self‐control, however, says that this is impossible: an agent cannot ever resist her currently strongest desire. The paper argues that one prominent solution to this puzzle – the solution offered by Al Mele – faces a serious ‘mismatch…
Deliberative Agency, Self‐Control, and the Divided Mind
According to a widely endorsed claim, intentional action is brought about by an agent's desires in accordance with these desires' respective motivational strength. As Jay Wallace has argued, though, this “hydraulic model” of the aetiology of intentional action has a serious flaw: it fails to leave room for genuine deliberative agency. Drawing on recent developments in the debate on self‐control, the article argues that Wallace's criticism can be …
Self-control and the self
The Mismatch Problem
Most of us have had the experience of resisting our currently strongest desire, for example, resisting the desire to eat another cookie when eating another cookie is what we most want to do. The puzzle of synchronic self‐control, however, says that this is impossible: an agent cannot ever resist her currently strongest desire. The paper argues that one prominent solution to this puzzle – the solution offered by Al Mele – faces a serious ‘mismatch…
Deliberative Agency, Self‐Control, and the Divided Mind
According to a widely endorsed claim, intentional action is brought about by an agent's desires in accordance with these desires' respective motivational strength. As Jay Wallace has argued, though, this “hydraulic model” of the aetiology of intentional action has a serious flaw: it fails to leave room for genuine deliberative agency. Drawing on recent developments in the debate on self‐control, the article argues that Wallace's criticism can be …
Self-control and the self
The Point of Blaming AI Systems
As Christian List has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasi…
The Hidden Values of Resisting Temptation
Self-control is generally regarded as a valuable capacity. However, the value of directly resisting temptations (a central part of our commonsense notion of self-control) has recently come under attack. Directly resisting temptations – as opposed to avoiding them – has been claimed to have several drawbacks, such as being an inefficient way of dealing with temptations, not contributing to an agent’s well-being, or even causing harmful “mental fra…
Too Much Self-Control
Although it seems commonsensical to say that one cannot merely have too little, but also too much self-control, the philosophical debate has largely focused on failures of self-control rather than its potential excesses. There are a few notable exceptions. But, by and large, the issue of having too much self-control has not received a lot of attention. This paper takes another careful look at the commonsensical position that it is possible to hav…
Narcissism, Entitlement, Responsibility
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the topic of moral responsibility for ‘non-ideal’ agents. And yet, one important type of ‘non-ideal’ agent, the narcissistic agent, has not received much attention. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap. My focus is on psychological entitlement, a feature that has been largely overlooked. I argue that this feature impairs narcissistic agents’ moral competence. This is because it both causes them to f…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Behavioral Health and Interventions (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Ontology (2 works) · Political science (2 works)