Nima Mussavifard
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996541 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nima Mussavifard |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nima |
| FAMILY NAME | Mussavifard |
| SIGNATURE | MUSSAVIFARD N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin |
| ORCID | 0009-0008-4582-9433 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Inferential communication: The primacy of external representations
We argue that intentionalist accounts of ostensive‐inferential communication fail to adequately explain the role of external representations in human communication. We propose that the contents of a specific form of representational communication, symbolic depictions via spatio‐temporal arrangements of objects, can be inferred without attributing mental states. We analyze the cognitive capacities that underpin the production and interpretation of…
Ostensive marking as a distinctive feature of human communication
Human communication possesses far more expressive power than any other communicative system in nature. In pragmatic theory, this flexibility is attributed to ostensive communication. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on the defining features of this system. Here, I offer an account of ostensive communication that avoids the cognitive demands associated with alternative approaches. These approaches (e.g., Griceanism) are committed to specific pro…
Metarepresenting in communication
The standard cognitive explanation for the emergence of human communication is that it rests largely on the expression and attribution of communicative intentions which are, in turn, enabled by complex metarepresentations of mental states. This complexity is at odds with the limited metapsychological abilities of infants. But mentalistic metarepresentations are neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining communication. Coded ostensive signals …
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Metarepresenting in communication
The standard cognitive explanation for the emergence of human communication is that it rests largely on the expression and attribution of communicative intentions which are, in turn, enabled by complex metarepresentations of mental states. This complexity is at odds with the limited metapsychological abilities of infants. But mentalistic metarepresentations are neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining communication. Coded ostensive signals …
Inferential communication: The primacy of external representations
We argue that intentionalist accounts of ostensive‐inferential communication fail to adequately explain the role of external representations in human communication. We propose that the contents of a specific form of representational communication, symbolic depictions via spatio‐temporal arrangements of objects, can be inferred without attributing mental states. We analyze the cognitive capacities that underpin the production and interpretation of…
Ostensive marking as a distinctive feature of human communication
Human communication possesses far more expressive power than any other communicative system in nature. In pragmatic theory, this flexibility is attributed to ostensive communication. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on the defining features of this system. Here, I offer an account of ostensive communication that avoids the cognitive demands associated with alternative approaches. These approaches (e.g., Griceanism) are committed to specific pro…
Cognition (2 works) · Human communication (2 works) · Language and cultural evolution (2 works) · Mental representation (2 works) · Ostensive definition (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (1 works) · Attribution (1 works) · Categorization, perception, and language (1 works) · Child and Animal Learning Development (1 works)