Eric Rémila
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996591 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric Rémila |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric |
| FAMILY NAME | Rémila |
| SIGNATURE | RÉMILA E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9265-9907 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods
Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
This study proposes a general framework for aggregation problems, in which agents’ signals given in an infinite sequence are aggregated. Notably, no restriction is imposed on the set of signals; hence, this framework is applicable to any type of attributes, including preferences, ballots, pieces of information, or judgments. The result can include the empty set that corresponds to the silence of the aggregation rule. Our main focus is to analyze …
Ranking rankings
Cooperative Games with Externalities, Marginalism and the Average approach
Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings
Infinite-population approval voting
Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value
Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
Preserving or removing special players
Weighted component fairness for forest games
Weighted component fairness for forest games
Preserving or removing special players
Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value
Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings
Infinite-population approval voting
Ranking rankings
Cooperative Games with Externalities, Marginalism and the Average approach
An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods
Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
This study proposes a general framework for aggregation problems, in which agents’ signals given in an infinite sequence are aggregated. Notably, no restriction is imposed on the set of signals; hence, this framework is applicable to any type of attributes, including preferences, ballots, pieces of information, or judgments. The result can include the empty set that corresponds to the silence of the aggregation rule. Our main focus is to analyze …
Game Theory and Voting Systems (11 works) · Mathematical economics (10 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Axiom (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Economics (7 works) · Game Theory and Applications (7 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (6 works) · Combinatorics (3 works) · Game theory (3 works)