Jeffrey Tolly
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996614 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeffrey Tolly |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeffrey |
| FAMILY NAME | Tolly |
| SIGNATURE | TOLLY J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Notre Dame |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3431-5161 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Cognitive Science of Religion, Reliability, and Perceiving God
Matthew Braddock’s argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending a counter-example to AFG’s crucial premise. In particular, I argue that the cognitive mechanisms posited by CSR do not “significantly contribute” to …
Reliabilism Defended
Reliabilism about knowledge states that a belief-forming process generates knowledge only if its likelihood of generating true belief exceeds 50 percent. Despite the prominence of reliabilism today, there are very few if any explicit arguments for reliabilism in the literature. In this essay, I address this lacuna by formulating a new independent argument for reliabilism. As I explain, reliabilism can be derived from certain key knowledge-closure…
Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types
Swampman
Reliabilism Defended
Reliabilism about knowledge states that a belief-forming process generates knowledge only if its likelihood of generating true belief exceeds 50 percent. Despite the prominence of reliabilism today, there are very few if any explicit arguments for reliabilism in the literature. In this essay, I address this lacuna by formulating a new independent argument for reliabilism. As I explain, reliabilism can be derived from certain key knowledge-closure…
Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types
Swampman
Cognitive Science of Religion, Reliability, and Perceiving God
Matthew Braddock’s argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending a counter-example to AFG’s crucial premise. In particular, I argue that the cognitive mechanisms posited by CSR do not “significantly contribute” to …
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills (1 work)