Alison A Springle
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996687 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alison A Springle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alison A |
| FAMILY NAME | Springle |
| SIGNATURE | SPRINGLE A A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oklahoma |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9880-1417 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
An action-first account of episodic memory
Building off of a recent account of intentionality, the action-forward framework, we introduce a novel account of episodic memory and defend its plausibility as an account of such memory. According to our account, episodic remembering consists in acts of performative retelling of the remembering subject’s initial experience of an event where such retelling activates connected capacities for perceptual recognition of the event and its constituents…
In Defense of the Essentially Epistemic Nature of Episodic Memory
According to the traditional approach in philosophy of memory, when all goes well, our episodic memories of particular events in our personal past constitute firsthand knowledge of the who , what , where , and what-was-it-like of those events. That is, according to the traditional approach, episodic memory is at bottom a capacity for a specific kind of knowledge . However, it’s now becoming increasingly common to treat the core epistemic dimensio…
Trauma, trust, & competent testimony
Public discourse implicitly appeals to what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument” (TUA). To motivate, articulate, and assess the TUA, we appeal to Hawley’s (2019) commitment account of trust and trustworthiness. On Hawley’s account, being trustworthy consists in the successful avoidance of unfulfilled commitments and involves three components: the actual avoidance of unfulfilled commitments, sincerity in one’s taking on elective comm…
Practical perceptual representations
According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representa…
Phenomenology
Inductive neutrality and scientific representation
Trusting Traumatic Memory
Court cases involving sexual assault and police violence rely heavily on victim testimony. We consider what we call the Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument (TUA) according to which we should be skeptical about victim testimony because people are particularly liable to misremember traumatic events. The TUA is not obviously based in mere distrust of women, people of color, disabled people, poor people, and so forth. Rather, it seeks to justify ske…
Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument
Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive repre…
Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function
According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate …
Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument
Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive repre…
Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function
According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate …
Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function
According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate …
Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument
Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive repre…
Phenomenology
Inductive neutrality and scientific representation
Trusting Traumatic Memory
Court cases involving sexual assault and police violence rely heavily on victim testimony. We consider what we call the Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument (TUA) according to which we should be skeptical about victim testimony because people are particularly liable to misremember traumatic events. The TUA is not obviously based in mere distrust of women, people of color, disabled people, poor people, and so forth. Rather, it seeks to justify ske…
Trauma, trust, & competent testimony
Public discourse implicitly appeals to what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument” (TUA). To motivate, articulate, and assess the TUA, we appeal to Hawley’s (2019) commitment account of trust and trustworthiness. On Hawley’s account, being trustworthy consists in the successful avoidance of unfulfilled commitments and involves three components: the actual avoidance of unfulfilled commitments, sincerity in one’s taking on elective comm…
Practical perceptual representations
According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representa…
In Defense of the Essentially Epistemic Nature of Episodic Memory
According to the traditional approach in philosophy of memory, when all goes well, our episodic memories of particular events in our personal past constitute firsthand knowledge of the who , what , where , and what-was-it-like of those events. That is, according to the traditional approach, episodic memory is at bottom a capacity for a specific kind of knowledge . However, it’s now becoming increasingly common to treat the core epistemic dimensio…
An action-first account of episodic memory
Building off of a recent account of intentionality, the action-forward framework, we introduce a novel account of episodic memory and defend its plausibility as an account of such memory. According to our account, episodic remembering consists in acts of performative retelling of the remembering subject’s initial experience of an event where such retelling activates connected capacities for perceptual recognition of the event and its constituents…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Memory Processes and Influences (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works)