Jack M C Kwong
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996697 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jack M C Kwong |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jack M C |
| FAMILY NAME | Kwong |
| SIGNATURE | KWONG J M C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Appalachian State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0171-0568 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Gatekeeping the mind
This paper proposes that we should think of epistemic agents as having, as one of their intellectual activities, a gatekeeping task: To decide in light of various criteria which ideas they should consider and which not to consider. When this task is performed with excellence, it is conducive to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge, and the reduction of falsehoods. Accordingly, it is a worthy contender for being an intell…
Despair and Hopelessness
It has recently been argued that hope is polysemous in that it sometimes refers to hoping and other times to being hopeful. That it has these two distinct senses is reflected in the observation that a person can hope for an outcome without being hopeful that it will occur. Below, I offer a new argument for this distinction. My strategy is to show that accepting this distinction yields a rich account of two distinct ways in which hope can be lost,…
The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness
Bitterness without hope
How to theorize about hope
In order to better understand the topic of hope, this article argues that two separate theories are needed: One for hoping, and the other for hopefulness. This bifurcated approach is warranted by the observation that the word “hope” is polysemous: It is sometimes used to refer to hoping and sometimes to feeling or being hopeful. Moreover, these two senses of “hope” are distinct, as a person can hope for some outcome yet not simultaneously feel ho…
Practitioner Wisdom
This conceptual paper explores the role that wisdom plays in social work. In the literature, this topic is primarily discussed in terms of ‘Practice Wisdom’, a kind of implicit and intuitive-based body of knowledge that is acquired through practice experience. After reviewing some formulations of it, we argue that practice wisdom faces a number of difficulties and is a misguided approach. To replace it, we propose a novel framework called ‘Practi…
Shame and moral autonomy
Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. T…
Hope and Hopefulness
This paper proposes a new framework for thinking about hope, with certain unexpected consequences. Specifically, I argue that a shift in focus from locutions like “ x hopes that” and “ x is hoping that” to “ x is hopeful that” and “ x has hope that” can improve our understanding of hope. This approach, which emphasizes hopefulness as the central concept, turns out to be more revealing and fruitful in tackling some of the issues that philosophers …
Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth
Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness
In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit‐based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open‐mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed‐minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open‐mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a …
Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness
In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit‐based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open‐mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed‐minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open‐mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a …
Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth
Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness
In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit‐based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open‐mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed‐minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open‐mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a …
Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth
Hope and Hopefulness
This paper proposes a new framework for thinking about hope, with certain unexpected consequences. Specifically, I argue that a shift in focus from locutions like “ x hopes that” and “ x is hoping that” to “ x is hopeful that” and “ x has hope that” can improve our understanding of hope. This approach, which emphasizes hopefulness as the central concept, turns out to be more revealing and fruitful in tackling some of the issues that philosophers …
Shame and moral autonomy
Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. T…
How to theorize about hope
In order to better understand the topic of hope, this article argues that two separate theories are needed: One for hoping, and the other for hopefulness. This bifurcated approach is warranted by the observation that the word “hope” is polysemous: It is sometimes used to refer to hoping and sometimes to feeling or being hopeful. Moreover, these two senses of “hope” are distinct, as a person can hope for some outcome yet not simultaneously feel ho…
Practitioner Wisdom
This conceptual paper explores the role that wisdom plays in social work. In the literature, this topic is primarily discussed in terms of ‘Practice Wisdom’, a kind of implicit and intuitive-based body of knowledge that is acquired through practice experience. After reviewing some formulations of it, we argue that practice wisdom faces a number of difficulties and is a misguided approach. To replace it, we propose a novel framework called ‘Practi…
The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness
Bitterness without hope
Despair and Hopelessness
It has recently been argued that hope is polysemous in that it sometimes refers to hoping and other times to being hopeful. That it has these two distinct senses is reflected in the observation that a person can hope for an outcome without being hopeful that it will occur. Below, I offer a new argument for this distinction. My strategy is to show that accepting this distinction yields a rich account of two distinct ways in which hope can be lost,…
Gatekeeping the mind
This paper proposes that we should think of epistemic agents as having, as one of their intellectual activities, a gatekeeping task: To decide in light of various criteria which ideas they should consider and which not to consider. When this task is performed with excellence, it is conducive to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge, and the reduction of falsehoods. Accordingly, it is a worthy contender for being an intell…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Virtue (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (3 works) · Optimism, Hope, and Well-being (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works)