Lisa Vogt
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996735 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lisa Vogt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lisa |
| FAMILY NAME | Vogt |
| SIGNATURE | VOGT L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Lucerne |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7025-7571 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Dispositions and Dependence
According to the principle No Upwards Essence , there are no cases in which some essentially depends on , yet grounds . One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates No Upwards Essence and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue that DE only violates No Upwards Essence in the presence of further contentious assumptions that proponents of DE ar…
Upwards essence
According to an influential view in the debate on grounding and essence, there cannot be any cases of ‘upwards essence’, i.e., cases in which a grounding connection flows from the essence of the grounding truth or constituents of it. To use the Finean (2012a) slogan, “it is the fact to be grounded that ‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground”. This paper argues to the contrary. Far from being outright incohe…
Cardinal Composition
The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa (Analysis 72(3):455–457, 2012) and Smith (Erkenntnis 84(1):41–55, 2019) to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn (Analysis 69(1):27–31, 2009a, Philos Q 59(235):193–201, 2009b). However, neither Weak Unrestricted …
Ground by Status
What is the explanatory role of ‘status-truths’ such as essence-truths, necessity-truths and law-truths? A plausible principle, suggested by various authors, is Ground by Status , according to which status truths ground their prejacents. For instance, if it is essential to a that p , then this grounds the fact that p . But Ground by Status faces a forceful objection: it is inconsistent with widely accepted principles regarding the logic of ground…
Two problems for Zylstra's truthmaker semantics for essence
In his article ‘Making semantics for essence’ (Inquiry, 2019), Justin Zylstra proposed a truthmaker semantics for essence and used it to evaluate principles regarding the explanatory role of essence. The aim of this article is to show that Zylstra's semantics has implausible implications and thus cannot adequately capture essence
Nominalist dispositional essentialism
Dispositional Essentialism, as commonly conceived, consists in the claims that at least some of the fundamental properties essentially confer certain causal-nomological roles on their bearers, and that these properties give rise to the natural modalities. As such, the view is generally taken to be committed to a realist conception of properties as either universals or tropes, and to be thus incompatible with nominalism as understood in the strict…
The strong arm of the law
A common feature of all standard theories of the laws of nature is that they are ‘absolutist’: They take laws to be either all metaphysically necessary or all contingent. Science, however, gives us reason to think that there are laws of both kinds, suggesting that standard theories should make way for ‘non-absolutist’ alternatives: theories which accommodate laws of both modal statuses. In this paper, we set out three explanatory challenges for a…
Schwerpunkte und Trends der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland (2007–2017)
No prominent works on this page.
Schwerpunkte und Trends der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland (2007–2017)
The strong arm of the law
A common feature of all standard theories of the laws of nature is that they are ‘absolutist’: They take laws to be either all metaphysically necessary or all contingent. Science, however, gives us reason to think that there are laws of both kinds, suggesting that standard theories should make way for ‘non-absolutist’ alternatives: theories which accommodate laws of both modal statuses. In this paper, we set out three explanatory challenges for a…
Nominalist dispositional essentialism
Dispositional Essentialism, as commonly conceived, consists in the claims that at least some of the fundamental properties essentially confer certain causal-nomological roles on their bearers, and that these properties give rise to the natural modalities. As such, the view is generally taken to be committed to a realist conception of properties as either universals or tropes, and to be thus incompatible with nominalism as understood in the strict…
Cardinal Composition
The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa (Analysis 72(3):455–457, 2012) and Smith (Erkenntnis 84(1):41–55, 2019) to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn (Analysis 69(1):27–31, 2009a, Philos Q 59(235):193–201, 2009b). However, neither Weak Unrestricted …
Ground by Status
What is the explanatory role of ‘status-truths’ such as essence-truths, necessity-truths and law-truths? A plausible principle, suggested by various authors, is Ground by Status , according to which status truths ground their prejacents. For instance, if it is essential to a that p , then this grounds the fact that p . But Ground by Status faces a forceful objection: it is inconsistent with widely accepted principles regarding the logic of ground…
Two problems for Zylstra's truthmaker semantics for essence
In his article ‘Making semantics for essence’ (Inquiry, 2019), Justin Zylstra proposed a truthmaker semantics for essence and used it to evaluate principles regarding the explanatory role of essence. The aim of this article is to show that Zylstra's semantics has implausible implications and thus cannot adequately capture essence
Dispositions and Dependence
According to the principle No Upwards Essence , there are no cases in which some essentially depends on , yet grounds . One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates No Upwards Essence and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue that DE only violates No Upwards Essence in the presence of further contentious assumptions that proponents of DE ar…
Upwards essence
According to an influential view in the debate on grounding and essence, there cannot be any cases of ‘upwards essence’, i.e., cases in which a grounding connection flows from the essence of the grounding truth or constituents of it. To use the Finean (2012a) slogan, “it is the fact to be grounded that ‘points’ to its grounds and not the grounds that point to what they may ground”. This paper argues to the contrary. Far from being outright incohe…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Essentialism (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works)