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Caroline Torpe Touborg

Biographic Data

ID5996791
NAMECaroline Torpe Touborg
GIVEN NAMESCaroline Torpe
FAMILY NAMETouborg
SIGNATURETOUBORG C T
AFFILIATIONSUmeå University
ORCID0000-0002-8281-5865
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS1
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX1
  • Reasons for action

    Open Access•Mattias Gunnemyr, Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2023

    In this paper, we present a new account of teleological reasons, i.e. reasons to perform a particular action because of the outcomes it promotes. Our account gives the desired verdict in a number of difficult cases, including cases of overdetermination and non-threshold cases like Parfit’s famous Drops of water. The key to our account is to look more closely at the metaphysics of causation. According to Touborg ( The dual nature of causation , 20…

  • You Just Didn't Care Enough

    Open Access•Mattias Gunnemyr, Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2023

    We refine the intuitively appealing idea that you are blameworthy for something if it happened because you did not care enough. More formally: you are blameworthy for X (where X may be an action, omission, or outcome) just in case there is the right causal-explanatory relation between your poor quality of will and X. First, we argue that blameworthiness for actions, omissions, and outcomes is concerned with negative differences: you are blamewort…

  • Relativizing proportionality to a domain of events

    Open Access•Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 28

    A cause is proportional to its effect when, roughly speaking, it is at the right level of detail. There is a lively debate about whether proportionality is a necessary condition for causation. One of the main arguments against a proportionality constraint on causation is that many ordinary and seemingly perfectly acceptable causal claims cite causes that are not proportional to their effects. In this paper, I suggest that proponents of a proporti…

  • Relativizing proportionality to a domain of events

    Open Access•Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 28

    A cause is proportional to its effect when, roughly speaking, it is at the right level of detail. There is a lively debate about whether proportionality is a necessary condition for causation. One of the main arguments against a proportionality constraint on causation is that many ordinary and seemingly perfectly acceptable causal claims cite causes that are not proportional to their effects. In this paper, I suggest that proponents of a proporti…

  • Relativizing proportionality to a domain of events

    Open Access•Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Cited by: 1•References: 28

    A cause is proportional to its effect when, roughly speaking, it is at the right level of detail. There is a lively debate about whether proportionality is a necessary condition for causation. One of the main arguments against a proportionality constraint on causation is that many ordinary and seemingly perfectly acceptable causal claims cite causes that are not proportional to their effects. In this paper, I suggest that proponents of a proporti…

  • Reasons for action

    Open Access•Mattias Gunnemyr, Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2023

    In this paper, we present a new account of teleological reasons, i.e. reasons to perform a particular action because of the outcomes it promotes. Our account gives the desired verdict in a number of difficult cases, including cases of overdetermination and non-threshold cases like Parfit’s famous Drops of water. The key to our account is to look more closely at the metaphysics of causation. According to Touborg ( The dual nature of causation , 20…

  • You Just Didn't Care Enough

    Open Access•Mattias Gunnemyr, Caroline Torpe Touborg•ARTICLE•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2023

    We refine the intuitively appealing idea that you are blameworthy for something if it happened because you did not care enough. More formally: you are blameworthy for X (where X may be an action, omission, or outcome) just in case there is the right causal-explanatory relation between your poor quality of will and X. First, we argue that blameworthiness for actions, omissions, and outcomes is concerned with negative differences: you are blamewort…

Causation (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Physics (2 works)

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