Lisa Cassell
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996849 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lisa Cassell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lisa |
| FAMILY NAME | Cassell |
| SIGNATURE | CASSELL L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, Baltimore County |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0186-2078 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Time-slice epistemology for Bayesians
Recently, some have challenged the idea that there are genuine norms of diachronic rationality. Part of this challenge has involved offering replacements for diachronic principles. Skeptics about diachronic rationality believe that we can provide an error theory for it by appealing to synchronic updating rules that, over time, mimic the behavior of diachronic norms. In this paper, I argue that the most promising attempts to develop this position …
The Positive Argument for Impermissivism
Epistemic impermissivism is the view that there is never more than one doxastic attitude it is rational to have in response to one's total evidence. Epistemic permissivism is the denial of this claim. The debate between the permissivist and the impermissivist has proceeded, in large part, by way of ‘negative’ arguments that highlight the unattractiveness of the opposing position. In light of the deadlock that has ensued, this paper has two aims. …
Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling
Bayesian coherentism
No prominent works on this page.
Bayesian coherentism
Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling
Time-slice epistemology for Bayesians
Recently, some have challenged the idea that there are genuine norms of diachronic rationality. Part of this challenge has involved offering replacements for diachronic principles. Skeptics about diachronic rationality believe that we can provide an error theory for it by appealing to synchronic updating rules that, over time, mimic the behavior of diachronic norms. In this paper, I argue that the most promising attempts to develop this position …
The Positive Argument for Impermissivism
Epistemic impermissivism is the view that there is never more than one doxastic attitude it is rational to have in response to one's total evidence. Epistemic permissivism is the denial of this claim. The debate between the permissivist and the impermissivist has proceeded, in large part, by way of ‘negative’ arguments that highlight the unattractiveness of the opposing position. In light of the deadlock that has ensued, this paper has two aims. …
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Bayesian probability (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Algorithm (1 works)