A K Flowerree
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996953 |
|---|---|
| NAME | A K Flowerree |
| GIVEN NAMES | A K |
| FAMILY NAME | Flowerree |
| SIGNATURE | FLOWERREE A K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas Tech University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7218-9522 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Epistemic reparations as social epistemic achievement
In this paper, I argue that epistemic reparations are complex social achievements. Previous accounts of epistemic reparations have failed to highlight the complex social nature of the epistemic goods that constitute epistemic reparations. To generate the knowledge required, a speaker must successfully communicate evaluatively robust content in a way that generates common knowledge. It is not sufficient for a speaker to offer information , they mu…
Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse
Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders …
When to Psychologize
The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question which is that of, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other pers…
Agency of belief and intention
Agency of belief and intention
When to Psychologize
The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question which is that of, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other pers…
Moral Grandstanding and the Norms of Moral Discourse
Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders …
Epistemic reparations as social epistemic achievement
In this paper, I argue that epistemic reparations are complex social achievements. Previous accounts of epistemic reparations have failed to highlight the complex social nature of the epistemic goods that constitute epistemic reparations. To generate the knowledge required, a speaker must successfully communicate evaluatively robust content in a way that generates common knowledge. It is not sufficient for a speaker to offer information , they mu…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 work)