Alfonso Anaya
Biographic Data
| ID | 5997128 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alfonso Anaya |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alfonso |
| FAMILY NAME | Anaya |
| SIGNATURE | ANAYA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7542-5263 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
On Being Self-Undermining, Conciliationism, and Rational Obstacles
Several epistemologists reject Conciliationism on the basis that it self-undermines. They maintain that self-undermining positions are untenable. We argue that these attacks fail to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with Conciliationism. To this end, we examine carefully what the problem can be. First, we discard three inadequate diagnoses - we argue that being self-undermining neither shows that the view is false, nor that it defe…
Idealized Models as Selective Representations
“Absent Contrary Indication”
It is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a resu…
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception
There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracchi has argued that her Competence View (CoV) of perception has the resources to strike a double feat: to provide an alternative to current representationalist hegemony while avoiding endorsing relationalism about perception. If successful, CoV could be s…
“Let Me Double‐Check That”
Double‐checking one's reasoning is a perfectly normal way of responding to a disagreement between peers. I argue that conciliationist approaches lack the resources to accommodate this phenomenon adequately. On the one hand, conciliationists cannot claim that double‐checking is a rationally impermissible response to disagreement because a compelling case for its permissibility appeals to arguments analogous to those often used by conciliationist i…
Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad: un análisis filosófico de la suerte, Cátedra, Madrid, 2019, 176 pp
No prominent works on this page.
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad: un análisis filosófico de la suerte, Cátedra, Madrid, 2019, 176 pp
Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception
There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracchi has argued that her Competence View (CoV) of perception has the resources to strike a double feat: to provide an alternative to current representationalist hegemony while avoiding endorsing relationalism about perception. If successful, CoV could be s…
“Let Me Double‐Check That”
Double‐checking one's reasoning is a perfectly normal way of responding to a disagreement between peers. I argue that conciliationist approaches lack the resources to accommodate this phenomenon adequately. On the one hand, conciliationists cannot claim that double‐checking is a rationally impermissible response to disagreement because a compelling case for its permissibility appeals to arguments analogous to those often used by conciliationist i…
Idealized Models as Selective Representations
“Absent Contrary Indication”
It is widely accepted that knowledge is incompatible with the presence of non-neutralized defeaters. A common way of addressing this issue is to introduce a condition to the effect that there are no non-neutralized defeaters for the belief that p (i.e. a “no-defeaters condition”). I argue that meeting this condition leaves open a possibility for defeaters to squander our knowledge. The no-defeaters condition can be fortuitously met, and as a resu…
On Being Self-Undermining, Conciliationism, and Rational Obstacles
Several epistemologists reject Conciliationism on the basis that it self-undermines. They maintain that self-undermining positions are untenable. We argue that these attacks fail to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with Conciliationism. To this end, we examine carefully what the problem can be. First, we discard three inadequate diagnoses - we argue that being self-undermining neither shows that the view is false, nor that it defe…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Direct and indirect realism (2 works) · Economics (2 works)