Andrea Polonioli
Biographic Data
| ID | 5997249 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrea Polonioli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrea |
| FAMILY NAME | Polonioli |
| SIGNATURE | POLONIOLI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Edinburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7275-5902 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The ethics of scientific recommender systems
A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy
Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic reviews are important tools that …
Reconsidering the normative argument from bounded rationality
I take a fresh look at the normative argument from bounded rationality, which has been offered as one particular line of criticism to resist pessimistic views on human rationality. Commentators in the “rationality debate” have generally interpreted the argument appealing to the ought-implies-can principle and considered it unconvincing. I suggest an alternative way to interpret the argument, which appeals to the framework of “adaptive rationality…
Stanovich's arguments against the “adaptive rationality” project
Blame It on the Norm
In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on t…
Reflecting on Gigerenzer’s critique of optimisation
Gigerenzer’s ‘external validity argument’ against the heuristics and biases program
Blame It on the Norm
In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on t…
Stanovich's arguments against the “adaptive rationality” project
Gigerenzer’s ‘external validity argument’ against the heuristics and biases program
Gigerenzer’s ‘external validity argument’ against the heuristics and biases program
Reflecting on Gigerenzer’s critique of optimisation
Blame It on the Norm
In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on t…
Stanovich's arguments against the “adaptive rationality” project
Reconsidering the normative argument from bounded rationality
I take a fresh look at the normative argument from bounded rationality, which has been offered as one particular line of criticism to resist pessimistic views on human rationality. Commentators in the “rationality debate” have generally interpreted the argument appealing to the ought-implies-can principle and considered it unconvincing. I suggest an alternative way to interpret the argument, which appeals to the framework of “adaptive rationality…
A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy
Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic reviews are important tools that …
The ethics of scientific recommender systems
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Rationality (4 works)