Douglas Farland
Biographic Data
| ID | 6001632 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Douglas Farland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Douglas |
| FAMILY NAME | Farland |
| SIGNATURE | FARLAND D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of KwaZulu-Natal |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
African Intuitions’ and Moral Theory
On Metz’s view, the best interpretation of ubuntu is that it enjoins agents always to promote harmony in the community. However, while I endorse the claim that intuitions play a foundational role in moral thinking, I am less sanguine about two aspects of Metz’s particular employment of the intuitions he focuses on. First, I doubt the intuitions from which he begins are of the right sort to play the role he would like them to play. Second, I doubt…
Principles, The Methodological Challenge And Our Obligations To The Worst-Off
Of all the ethical questions, the one of what we owe our fellow humans (and, in particular, the least well-off in society) seems to be both the most pressing and the one around which there is the least agreement. Plausible-looking answers range from the extremely demanding claim that we are obliged to give to others until giving to them costs us more than it benefits them, to the minimally demanding claim that we are not obliged to give to others…
Mackie’s Error Theory and Reasons
The error theory has, for some time, served as a last resort for those who would like to take moral realism seriously but who cannot countenance the thought that moral properties might be non-natural. As soon as their attempts to ‘square’ moral properties with natural properties appear to be in trouble, such philosophers resort to the line that the error theory is true. But the error theory trades mostly upon Mackie’s influential argument from qu…
Let's Get Real about Moral Particularism
In his book Moral Reasons, Jonathan Dancy describes the problem of accidie as the most serious source of objections to cognitivist approaches to moral motivation. If weakness of will is possible, and Dancy himself finds it difficult to deny that it is, then it seems that the person suffering from weakness of will differs from the motivated person only in respect of his/her failing to share a desire to perform the action which is believed by both …
African Intuitions’ and Moral Theory
On Metz’s view, the best interpretation of ubuntu is that it enjoins agents always to promote harmony in the community. However, while I endorse the claim that intuitions play a foundational role in moral thinking, I am less sanguine about two aspects of Metz’s particular employment of the intuitions he focuses on. First, I doubt the intuitions from which he begins are of the right sort to play the role he would like them to play. Second, I doubt…
Let's Get Real about Moral Particularism
In his book Moral Reasons, Jonathan Dancy describes the problem of accidie as the most serious source of objections to cognitivist approaches to moral motivation. If weakness of will is possible, and Dancy himself finds it difficult to deny that it is, then it seems that the person suffering from weakness of will differs from the motivated person only in respect of his/her failing to share a desire to perform the action which is believed by both …
Mackie’s Error Theory and Reasons
The error theory has, for some time, served as a last resort for those who would like to take moral realism seriously but who cannot countenance the thought that moral properties might be non-natural. As soon as their attempts to ‘square’ moral properties with natural properties appear to be in trouble, such philosophers resort to the line that the error theory is true. But the error theory trades mostly upon Mackie’s influential argument from qu…
African Intuitions’ and Moral Theory
On Metz’s view, the best interpretation of ubuntu is that it enjoins agents always to promote harmony in the community. However, while I endorse the claim that intuitions play a foundational role in moral thinking, I am less sanguine about two aspects of Metz’s particular employment of the intuitions he focuses on. First, I doubt the intuitions from which he begins are of the right sort to play the role he would like them to play. Second, I doubt…
Principles, The Methodological Challenge And Our Obligations To The Worst-Off
Of all the ethical questions, the one of what we owe our fellow humans (and, in particular, the least well-off in society) seems to be both the most pressing and the one around which there is the least agreement. Plausible-looking answers range from the extremely demanding claim that we are obliged to give to others until giving to them costs us more than it benefits them, to the minimally demanding claim that we are not obliged to give to others…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · African cultural and philosophical studies (1 work) · Autonomy (1 work) · Beneficence (1 work)