Lambert Schoonbeek
Biographic Data
| ID | 6037357 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lambert Schoonbeek |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lambert |
| FAMILY NAME | Schoonbeek |
| SIGNATURE | SCHOONBEEK L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Groningen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3337-4397 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed
Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement
Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement
Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed
Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement
Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest
We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed
Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · CONTEST (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Macroeconomics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Public finance (4 works) · Rent-seeking (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works)