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Refael Hassin

Biographic Data

ID6037452
NAMERefael Hassin
GIVEN NAMESRefael
FAMILY NAMEHassin
SIGNATUREHASSIN R
AFFILIATIONSTel Aviv University
ORCID0000-0001-9631-6162
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS3
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1998
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1
  • Bystanders

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

  • The Calculus of Stonewalling

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2001•References: 10

    We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, either by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. If politicians are risk-neutral, then in equilibrium all choose to be evaluated. If politicians are risk-averse, then whether when they do or do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians can avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluati…

  • Sequential Rent Seeking

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2000•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Governmental failures in evaluating programs

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1998•Cited by: 1•References: 21

  • Sequential Rent Seeking

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2000•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • Governmental failures in evaluating programs

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1998•Cited by: 1•References: 21

  • Governmental failures in evaluating programs

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1998•Cited by: 1•References: 21

  • Sequential Rent Seeking

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2000•Cited by: 2•References: 5

  • The Calculus of Stonewalling

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2001•References: 10

    We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, either by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. If politicians are risk-neutral, then in equilibrium all choose to be evaluated. If politicians are risk-averse, then whether when they do or do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians can avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluati…

  • Bystanders

    Open Access•Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Public finance (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Commit (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations (1 work)

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