Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Biographic Data
| ID | 6037473 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera |
| GIVEN NAMES | Juan-Carlos |
| FAMILY NAME | Altamirano-Cabrera |
| SIGNATURE | ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA J |
| AFFILIATIONS | World Resources Institute |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
National political pressure groups and the stability of international environmental agreements
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on transboundary emissions of individual countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements to reduce emissions. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists, and we allow for asymmetric countries to consider differences in lobby strengths to study strategic international spillovers of national lobby activities. In our model, lobby gro…
The political economy of international environmental agreements
Trade-offs and performances of a range of alternative global climate architectures for post-2012
The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
The political economy of international environmental agreements
Trade-offs and performances of a range of alternative global climate architectures for post-2012
National political pressure groups and the stability of international environmental agreements
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on transboundary emissions of individual countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements to reduce emissions. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists, and we allow for asymmetric countries to consider differences in lobby strengths to study strategic international spillovers of national lobby activities. In our model, lobby gro…
The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
Trade-offs and performances of a range of alternative global climate architectures for post-2012
The political economy of international environmental agreements
National political pressure groups and the stability of international environmental agreements
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on transboundary emissions of individual countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements to reduce emissions. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists, and we allow for asymmetric countries to consider differences in lobby strengths to study strategic international spillovers of national lobby activities. In our model, lobby gro…
Climate Change Policy and Economics (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works)