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Lars-Erik Borge

Biographic Data

ID6037650
NAMELars-Erik Borge
GIVEN NAMESLars-Erik
FAMILY NAMEBorge
SIGNATUREBORGE L
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS12
TOTAL CITATIONS53
AUTHOR COUNT12
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1995
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX3
  • Fiscal equalization in Nordic municipalities: Institutions and inequalities

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2026•References: 27

    The topic of this paper is fiscal equalization among municipalities in the four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Fiscal equalization refers to transfers of financial resources to and between municipalities with the aim of mitigating regional differences in fiscal capacities and spending needs. More specifically, we ask the following research question: How does fiscal equalization impact spatial inequalities? We conduct a co…

  • Less fiscal oversight, more adjustment

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2020

    In Norway, a reform in 2001 lifted budget and borrowing approval for local governments that comply with the balanced budget requirement (BBR). It was a concern that less fiscal oversight would lead to less fiscal discipline. A neglected effect however, was that the reform implicitly introduced sanctions for violating the BBR. In addition a register informing financial institutions about authorities in need of borrowing approval provides voters wi…

  • Partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector: Theory and evidence from Norway

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2014•Cited by: 3•References: 30

  • Myopic or Constrained by Balanced-Budget Rules? The Intertemporal Spending Behavior of Norwegian Local Governments

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2009

    The paper analyzes the intertemporal spending behavior of Norwegian local governments with particular attention to liquidity constraints imposed by balanced-budget rules. The main findings are: (i) On average, local government spending behavior is neither perfectly forward looking nor fully myopic. (ii) Local governments with good fiscal conditions behave more forward looking than other local governments. (iii) A high degree of party fragmentatio…

  • Young and Old Competing for Public Welfare Services

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2008

  • Public sector efficiency: The roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2008•Cited by: 27•References: 32

  • Efficiency Potential and Efficiency Variation in Norwegian Lower Secondary Schools

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2006

    eflect both higher resource use and lower student performance.

  • The Relationships between Costs and User Charges: The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2005

    Governments struggle with rising service spending, and user charges represent a possible incentive mechanism to control costs. This paper investigates the relationships between costs and user charges in the sewage industry in Norwegian local governments. The analysis addresses the following questions: (i) To what extent are increased costs passed on to consumers in higher user charges? (ii) Does user-charge financing lead to higher or lower unit …

  • Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2002•Cited by: 3•References: 9

  • Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 3•References: 3

  • Economic and political determinants of fee income in Norwegian local governments

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•Cited by: 13•References: 16

  • Local government service production: The politics of allocative sluggishness

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•Cited by: 4•References: 18

  • Public sector efficiency: The roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2008•Cited by: 27•References: 32

  • Economic and political determinants of fee income in Norwegian local governments

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•Cited by: 13•References: 16

  • Local government service production: The politics of allocative sluggishness

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•Cited by: 4•References: 18

  • Partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector: Theory and evidence from Norway

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2014•Cited by: 3•References: 30

  • Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2002•Cited by: 3•References: 9

  • Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 3•References: 3

  • Economic and political determinants of fee income in Norwegian local governments

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•Cited by: 13•References: 16

  • Local government service production: The politics of allocative sluggishness

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•Cited by: 4•References: 18

  • Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 3•References: 3

  • Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2002•Cited by: 3•References: 9

  • The Relationships between Costs and User Charges: The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2005

    Governments struggle with rising service spending, and user charges represent a possible incentive mechanism to control costs. This paper investigates the relationships between costs and user charges in the sewage industry in Norwegian local governments. The analysis addresses the following questions: (i) To what extent are increased costs passed on to consumers in higher user charges? (ii) Does user-charge financing lead to higher or lower unit …

  • Efficiency Potential and Efficiency Variation in Norwegian Lower Secondary Schools

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2006

    eflect both higher resource use and lower student performance.

  • Young and Old Competing for Public Welfare Services

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2008

  • Public sector efficiency: The roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2008•Cited by: 27•References: 32

  • Myopic or Constrained by Balanced-Budget Rules? The Intertemporal Spending Behavior of Norwegian Local Governments

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2009

    The paper analyzes the intertemporal spending behavior of Norwegian local governments with particular attention to liquidity constraints imposed by balanced-budget rules. The main findings are: (i) On average, local government spending behavior is neither perfectly forward looking nor fully myopic. (ii) Local governments with good fiscal conditions behave more forward looking than other local governments. (iii) A high degree of party fragmentatio…

  • Partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector: Theory and evidence from Norway

    Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2014•Cited by: 3•References: 30

  • Less fiscal oversight, more adjustment

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•European Journal of Political…•2020

    In Norway, a reform in 2001 lifted budget and borrowing approval for local governments that comply with the balanced budget requirement (BBR). It was a concern that less fiscal oversight would lead to less fiscal discipline. A neglected effect however, was that the reform implicitly introduced sanctions for violating the BBR. In addition a register informing financial institutions about authorities in need of borrowing approval provides voters wi…

  • Fiscal equalization in Nordic municipalities: Institutions and inequalities

    Open Access•Lars–erik Borges, Lars-Erik Borge et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2026•References: 27

    The topic of this paper is fiscal equalization among municipalities in the four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Fiscal equalization refers to transfers of financial resources to and between municipalities with the aim of mitigating regional differences in fiscal capacities and spending needs. More specifically, we ask the following research question: How does fiscal equalization impact spatial inequalities? We conduct a co…

Economics (11 works) · Political science (9 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (8 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (8 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (8 works) · Public economics (8 works) · Macroeconomics (7 works) · Norwegian (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Business (5 works)

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