Aaron B Strauss
Biographic Data
| ID | 6037856 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aaron B Strauss |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aaron B |
| FAMILY NAME | Strauss |
| SIGNATURE | STRAUSS A B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Mellman Group, 1023 31st St. NW, Fifth Floor, Washington, DC 20007, USA, |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 86 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Uncertain candidates, valence, and the dynamics of candidate position-taking
The Implications of High Court Docket Control for Resource Allocation and Legal Efficiency
A key source of institutional variation across judicial systems is the degree of control that the highest court has over its docket. Despite this variation, the consequences of various institutional designs in judicial hierarchies remain relatively unexplored by the theoretical literature. In this article, we develop a formal model of high court resource allocation. We analyze the model under two institutional designs: (1) the Court must allocate…
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties' minimal-integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties. In addition, we develop a stati…
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties' minimal-integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties. In addition, we develop a stati…
Uncertain candidates, valence, and the dynamics of candidate position-taking
The Implications of High Court Docket Control for Resource Allocation and Legal Efficiency
A key source of institutional variation across judicial systems is the degree of control that the highest court has over its docket. Despite this variation, the consequences of various institutional designs in judicial hierarchies remain relatively unexplored by the theoretical literature. In this article, we develop a formal model of high court resource allocation. We analyze the model under two institutional designs: (1) the Court must allocate…
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties' minimal-integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties. In addition, we develop a stati…
Uncertain candidates, valence, and the dynamics of candidate position-taking
The Implications of High Court Docket Control for Resource Allocation and Legal Efficiency
A key source of institutional variation across judicial systems is the degree of control that the highest court has over its docket. Despite this variation, the consequences of various institutional designs in judicial hierarchies remain relatively unexplored by the theoretical literature. In this article, we develop a formal model of high court resource allocation. We analyze the model under two institutional designs: (1) the Court must allocate…
Economics (3 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Business (1 work) · Cabinet (room (1 work)