Ton Storcken
Biographic Data
| ID | 6038115 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ton Storcken |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ton |
| FAMILY NAME | Storcken |
| SIGNATURE | STORCKEN T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Maastricht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7142-9344 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some partial order. This partial order might differ for different individuals. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which these restricted domains admit unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
In this paper, we consider choice functions that are unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof and consider domains that are single-peaked on some tree. We prove the following three results in this setting. First, there exists a unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof choice function on a path-connected domain if and only if the domain is single-peaked on a tree and the number of agents is odd. Second, a choice f…
On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules
Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
Measuring polarization in preferences
Update monotone preference rules
Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
Centrality Orderings in Social Networks
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox
Decomposable effectivity functions
Measuring intransitivity
Decomposable effectivity functions
Measuring intransitivity
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox
Centrality Orderings in Social Networks
Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
Update monotone preference rules
Measuring polarization in preferences
Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
In this paper, we consider choice functions that are unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof and consider domains that are single-peaked on some tree. We prove the following three results in this setting. First, there exists a unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof choice function on a path-connected domain if and only if the domain is single-peaked on a tree and the number of agents is odd. Second, a choice f…
Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
We consider restricted domains where each individual has a domain of preferences containing some partial order. This partial order might differ for different individuals. Necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated under which these restricted domains admit unanimous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules
Game Theory and Voting Systems (12 works) · Mathematics (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Mathematical economics (10 works) · Game Theory and Applications (6 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Combinatorics (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works)