Christian Traxler
Biographic Data
| ID | 6038304 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christian Traxler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christian |
| FAMILY NAME | Traxler |
| SIGNATURE | TRAXLER C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Max Planck Society |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Exposure to Law Enforcement and Deterrence
This paper explores how direct and indirect exposure to law enforcement activities shape deterrent effects. Focusing on experimental and quasi-experimental research from economics (mainly from domains such as tax evasion, traffic violations, and financial crimes), I first summarize evidence showing how personal experiences shape perceptions about enforcement risks and sanctions, and deter future offenses. The paper then turns to the role of vicar…
Salience and Timely Compliance
This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rate…
Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imp…
Enforcement Spillovers
This paper identifies spillovers from law enforcement. Our approach makes use of microdata on compliance with TV license fees that allow us to distinguish between households that were subject to enforcement and those that were not. Using snowfall as an instrument for local inspections, we find a striking response of households to increased enforcement in their vicinity: on average, three detections make one additional household comply with the la…
Reserve prices as reference points – Evidence from auctions for football players at Hattrick.org
Voting over taxes
This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich
Salience and Timely Compliance
This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rate…
Voting over taxes
This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich
Reserve prices as reference points – Evidence from auctions for football players at Hattrick.org
Voting over taxes
This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich
Reserve prices as reference points – Evidence from auctions for football players at Hattrick.org
Enforcement Spillovers
This paper identifies spillovers from law enforcement. Our approach makes use of microdata on compliance with TV license fees that allow us to distinguish between households that were subject to enforcement and those that were not. Using snowfall as an instrument for local inspections, we find a striking response of households to increased enforcement in their vicinity: on average, three detections make one additional household comply with the la…
Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imp…
Salience and Timely Compliance
This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rate…
Exposure to Law Enforcement and Deterrence
This paper explores how direct and indirect exposure to law enforcement activities shape deterrent effects. Focusing on experimental and quasi-experimental research from economics (mainly from domains such as tax evasion, traffic violations, and financial crimes), I first summarize evidence showing how personal experiences shape perceptions about enforcement risks and sanctions, and deter future offenses. The paper then turns to the role of vicar…
Economics (6 works) · Business (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Public economics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Enforcement (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works)