Gustavo Bergantiños
Biographic Data
| ID | 6038744 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gustavo Bergantiños |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gustavo |
| FAMILY NAME | Bergantiños |
| SIGNATURE | BERGANTIÑOS G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade de Vigo |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2592-5213 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports
We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity . Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. However, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just repl…
On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
We take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing problem from broadcasting sports leagues. We formalize two notions of impartiality, depending on the stance one takes with respect to the revenue generated in the games involving each pair of teams. We show that the resulting two axioms lead towards two broad categories of rules, when combined with additivity and some other basic axioms. We complement those results str…
The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources
The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems
Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems
A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
The folk rule through a painting procedure for minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources
On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
We take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing problem from broadcasting sports leagues. We formalize two notions of impartiality, depending on the stance one takes with respect to the revenue generated in the games involving each pair of teams. We show that the resulting two axioms lead towards two broad categories of rules, when combined with additivity and some other basic axioms. We complement those results str…
Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports
We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity . Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. However, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just repl…
Computer Science (7 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Axiom (3 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Game theory (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)