Ehud Kalai
Biographic Data
| ID | 6038839 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ehud Kalai |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ehud |
| FAMILY NAME | Kalai |
| SIGNATURE | KALAI E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Decision Sciences (United States) |
| ORCID | 0009-0000-0725-0449 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Information Independence and Common Knowledge
In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence (the opponents' types are independent conditional on one's own) and (ii) type disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, condi…
Unobserved Delegation
The paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potentiual for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.
Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
Mathematics for social scientists
Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed. WE CONSIDER a two-person bargaining problem mathematically formulated as follows. To every …
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed. WE CONSIDER a two-person bargaining problem mathematically formulated as follows. To every …
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations
Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
Mathematics for social scientists
Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
Unobserved Delegation
The paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potentiual for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.
Information Independence and Common Knowledge
In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence (the opponents' types are independent conditional on one's own) and (ii) type disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, condi…
Mathematical economics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works)