Anthony Chemero
Biographic Data
| ID | 604663 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anthony Chemero |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anthony |
| FAMILY NAME | Chemero |
| SIGNATURE | CHEMERO A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cincinnati |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5987-4106 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 28 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 111 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Affordances, phenomenology, pragmatism and the myth of the given
This paper addresses a potential contradiction between the two primary philosophical traditions that inform Gibsonian ecological psychology: the phenomenological and pragmatist traditions. These two traditions exhibit potentially contradictory intuitions about the epistemic role of direct perception. This epistemic role of direct perception was famously problematized by Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given (1956; 1997), and we draw on it he…
Constructive constraints: On the role of chance and complexity in artistic creativity
Creativity is sometimes understood as the individual, mental creation of novelty which is then imposed as form onto a material substrate. On this view, constraints would feature only as obstacles in the creative process. In contrast, we support the view that creativity emerges from the interactions between human agents and the material, cultural, and social constraints that comprise a particular situation. In this account, constraints play a key …
LLMs differ from human cognition because they are not embodied
Reconsidering perceptual constancy
The world shows some degree of invariance, and we perceive this invariance despite a lot of variation generated locally by our movements, changes in illumination, and the way in which our sense organs react to stimulation. Generally, philosophy and psychology each explain our perception of invariance through the notion of ‘perceptual constancy’. According to the traditional definition, perceptual constancies are capacities to perceive the objecti…
Radical embodiment in two directions
Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psycholo…
Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
Technology may change cognition without necessarily harming it
Worlds Apart? Reassessing von Uexküll’s Umwelt in Embodied Cognition with Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze
Jakob von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) account of Umwelt has been proposed as a mediating concept to bridge the gap between ecological psychology’s realism about environmental information and enactivism’s emphasis on the organism’s active role in constructing the meaningful world it inhabits. If successful, this move would constitute a significant step towards establishing a single ecological-enactive framework for cognitive science. However, Uexküll’s …
General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for ‘higher’ cognition
In this paper, we address the question of how an agent can guide its behavior with respect to aspects of the sociomaterial environment that are not sensorily present. A simple example is how an animal can relate to a food source while only sensing a pheromone, or how an agent can relate to beer, while only the refrigerator is directly sensorily present. Certain cases in which something is absent have been characterized by others as requiring ‘hig…
Interacting in the Open: Where Dynamical Systems Become Extended and Embodied
Dynamical systems theories describe a wide range of theoretical orientations in cognitive science. In this chapter we focus on a particular formulation of dynamical systems theory that provides a strong theoretical basis for some of the claims made by 4E approaches to cognition. In particular, the target dynamical systems approaches depend on two hypotheses. First, the interaction hypothesis states that the states and behaviors of any entity in a…
Perceptually Equivalent Judgments Made Visually and via Haptic Sensory-Substitution Devices
According to the ecological theory of perception–action, perception is primarily of affordances, which are directly perceivable opportunities for behavior. The current study evaluated participants’ ability to use vision and haptic sensory-substitution devices to support perceptual judgments of affordances involving the task of passing through apertures. Sighted participants made perceptual judgments about whether they could walk through apertures…
From Kepler to Gibson
We argue that the idea of embodiment and the strategies for carrying out embodied approaches are some of the most prevalent and interdisciplinary legacies of early modern science. The idea of embodiment is simple: to explain the behavior of bodies, we must understand them as unified wholes in their environments. Embodied approaches eschew explanations in terms of qualitative descriptions of the intrinsic properties of bodies and promote explanati…
Phenomenology: An Introduction
The value of affordances
Ecological psychology (see Gibson, 1979) is generally thought of as comprising two main claims. The first is that perception is direct insofar as it is not the result of information added to sensor
Le fantôme et la machine
Martin Jonathan,Chemero Anthony. Le fantôme et la machine. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°60, 2013/2. Pragmatisme(s) et sciences cognitives. pp. 251-261
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to …
Modeling Self-Organization With Nonwellfounded Set Theory
In this article, I use graphical tools from nonwellfounded set theory to model a variety of complex systems. I focus in particular on autocatakinetic systems. First there is a tutorial, explaining how to use the graphical tools of nonwellfounded set theory to model complex systems. I use these graphical tools to show that autocatakinetic systems are closed to efficient cause. Then I compare autocatakinetic systems with autopoietic systems. Finall…
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation. While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, A…
Naturalizing Perception: Developing the Gibsonian Approach to Perception along Evolutionary Lines
We believe that one of the most important aspects of Gibson's ecological psychology is his attempted naturalization of perception, that is, his attempt to place perception in the context of evolutionary theory. However, the dominant neo-Gibsonian approach to perception has been criticized for being inconsistent with evolutionary theory. We argue that a central tenet of this approach indeed runs counter to evolutionary considerations. Based on an …
Radical embodied cognitive science
Anthony Chemero makes a proposal for a new way to do cognitive science, arguing that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation & representation
Self-Organization, Writ Large
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting…
Object Exploration and a Problem with Reductionism
An Outline of a Theory of Affordances
A theory of affordances is outlined according to which affordances are relations be-tween the abilities of animals and features of the environment. As relations, affordances are both real and perceivable but are not properties of either the environ-ment or the animal. I argue that this theory has advantages over extant theories of affordances and briefly discuss the relations among affordances and niches, perceivers, and events. The primary diffe…
Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances
In a target article that appeared in Ecological Psychology, Stoffregen (2000a) questioned the possibility of ecological event perception research. This article describes experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero (2000).We found that participants reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our find…
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting…
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to …
General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for ‘higher’ cognition
In this paper, we address the question of how an agent can guide its behavior with respect to aspects of the sociomaterial environment that are not sensorily present. A simple example is how an animal can relate to a food source while only sensing a pheromone, or how an agent can relate to beer, while only the refrigerator is directly sensorily present. Certain cases in which something is absent have been characterized by others as requiring ‘hig…
Radical embodiment in two directions
Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psycholo…
Anti-Representationalism and the Dynamical Stance
Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti-representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti-representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representa…
LLMs differ from human cognition because they are not embodied
Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
Technology may change cognition without necessarily harming it
Worlds Apart? Reassessing von Uexküll’s Umwelt in Embodied Cognition with Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze
Jakob von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) account of Umwelt has been proposed as a mediating concept to bridge the gap between ecological psychology’s realism about environmental information and enactivism’s emphasis on the organism’s active role in constructing the meaningful world it inhabits. If successful, this move would constitute a significant step towards establishing a single ecological-enactive framework for cognitive science. However, Uexküll’s …
Object Exploration and a Problem with Reductionism
What Events Are
Stoffregen's (this issue) target article reminds us of many things about affordances and events, but it also argues for points that cannot be maintained. In particular, Stoffregen argues that animals do not perceive events. This result, if it turned out to be true, would create widespread consequences for ecological psychology. I argue that Stoffregen is incorrect: We do perceive events. To see that this is the case, however, requires a new conce…
Anti-Representationalism and the Dynamical Stance
Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti-representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti-representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representa…
What We Perceive When We Perceive Affordances: "Commentary on Michaels (2000) "Information, Perception, and Action
In her article "Information, Perception, and Action: What Should Ecological Psychologists Learn From Milner and Goodale (1995)?" Michaels (2000) reached 2 conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claimed that affordances are not perceived but simply acted on; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based on a misinterpretation of empirical …
An Outline of a Theory of Affordances
A theory of affordances is outlined according to which affordances are relations be-tween the abilities of animals and features of the environment. As relations, affordances are both real and perceivable but are not properties of either the environ-ment or the animal. I argue that this theory has advantages over extant theories of affordances and briefly discuss the relations among affordances and niches, perceivers, and events. The primary diffe…
Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances
In a target article that appeared in Ecological Psychology, Stoffregen (2000a) questioned the possibility of ecological event perception research. This article describes experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero (2000).We found that participants reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our find…
Object Exploration and a Problem with Reductionism
Self-Organization, Writ Large
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting…
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation. While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, A…
Naturalizing Perception: Developing the Gibsonian Approach to Perception along Evolutionary Lines
We believe that one of the most important aspects of Gibson's ecological psychology is his attempted naturalization of perception, that is, his attempt to place perception in the context of evolutionary theory. However, the dominant neo-Gibsonian approach to perception has been criticized for being inconsistent with evolutionary theory. We argue that a central tenet of this approach indeed runs counter to evolutionary considerations. Based on an …
Radical embodied cognitive science
Anthony Chemero makes a proposal for a new way to do cognitive science, arguing that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation & representation
Modeling Self-Organization With Nonwellfounded Set Theory
In this article, I use graphical tools from nonwellfounded set theory to model a variety of complex systems. I focus in particular on autocatakinetic systems. First there is a tutorial, explaining how to use the graphical tools of nonwellfounded set theory to model complex systems. I use these graphical tools to show that autocatakinetic systems are closed to efficient cause. Then I compare autocatakinetic systems with autopoietic systems. Finall…
Le fantôme et la machine
Martin Jonathan,Chemero Anthony. Le fantôme et la machine. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°60, 2013/2. Pragmatisme(s) et sciences cognitives. pp. 251-261
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to …
The value of affordances
Ecological psychology (see Gibson, 1979) is generally thought of as comprising two main claims. The first is that perception is direct insofar as it is not the result of information added to sensor
Phenomenology: An Introduction
From Kepler to Gibson
We argue that the idea of embodiment and the strategies for carrying out embodied approaches are some of the most prevalent and interdisciplinary legacies of early modern science. The idea of embodiment is simple: to explain the behavior of bodies, we must understand them as unified wholes in their environments. Embodied approaches eschew explanations in terms of qualitative descriptions of the intrinsic properties of bodies and promote explanati…
Interacting in the Open: Where Dynamical Systems Become Extended and Embodied
Dynamical systems theories describe a wide range of theoretical orientations in cognitive science. In this chapter we focus on a particular formulation of dynamical systems theory that provides a strong theoretical basis for some of the claims made by 4E approaches to cognition. In particular, the target dynamical systems approaches depend on two hypotheses. First, the interaction hypothesis states that the states and behaviors of any entity in a…
Perceptually Equivalent Judgments Made Visually and via Haptic Sensory-Substitution Devices
According to the ecological theory of perception–action, perception is primarily of affordances, which are directly perceivable opportunities for behavior. The current study evaluated participants’ ability to use vision and haptic sensory-substitution devices to support perceptual judgments of affordances involving the task of passing through apertures. Sighted participants made perceptual judgments about whether they could walk through apertures…
General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for ‘higher’ cognition
In this paper, we address the question of how an agent can guide its behavior with respect to aspects of the sociomaterial environment that are not sensorily present. A simple example is how an animal can relate to a food source while only sensing a pheromone, or how an agent can relate to beer, while only the refrigerator is directly sensorily present. Certain cases in which something is absent have been characterized by others as requiring ‘hig…
Worlds Apart? Reassessing von Uexküll’s Umwelt in Embodied Cognition with Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze
Jakob von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) account of Umwelt has been proposed as a mediating concept to bridge the gap between ecological psychology’s realism about environmental information and enactivism’s emphasis on the organism’s active role in constructing the meaningful world it inhabits. If successful, this move would constitute a significant step towards establishing a single ecological-enactive framework for cognitive science. However, Uexküll’s …
Radical embodiment in two directions
Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psycholo…
Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
Technology may change cognition without necessarily harming it
Reconsidering perceptual constancy
The world shows some degree of invariance, and we perceive this invariance despite a lot of variation generated locally by our movements, changes in illumination, and the way in which our sense organs react to stimulation. Generally, philosophy and psychology each explain our perception of invariance through the notion of ‘perceptual constancy’. According to the traditional definition, perceptual constancies are capacities to perceive the objecti…
Psychology (21 works) · Cognitive science (19 works) · Epistemology (18 works) · Computer Science (16 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (16 works) · Cognitive psychology (15 works) · Philosophy (15 works) · Artificial Intelligence (10 works) · Affordance (9 works) · Perception (9 works)