Vicki Knoblauch
Biographic Data
| ID | 6102769 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vicki Knoblauch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vicki |
| FAMILY NAME | Knoblauch |
| SIGNATURE | KNOBLAUCH V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Connecticut |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Feature-based preference representation and feature linkage
The lexicographic complexity of asymmetric binary relations
Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
Elections generate all binary relations on infinite sets
What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
Dividing profits three ways
Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (OSBORNE [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the …
On the profitability of collusion in location games
An Easy Proof That a Square Lattice Is an Equilibrium for Spatial Competition in the Plane
An Easy Proof That a Square Lattice Is an Equilibrium for Spatial Competition in the Plane
On the profitability of collusion in location games
Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (OSBORNE [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the …
Dividing profits three ways
What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
Elections generate all binary relations on infinite sets
Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
The lexicographic complexity of asymmetric binary relations
Feature-based preference representation and feature linkage
Mathematics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (3 works) · Binary relation (3 works) · Discrete mathematics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Arithmetic (2 works)