Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Jiangnan Zeng

Biographic Data

ID6102878
NAMEJiangnan Zeng
GIVEN NAMESJiangnan
FAMILY NAMEZeng
SIGNATUREZENG J
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Guelph
ORCID0000-0001-6136-7066
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS2
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR2
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1
  • The elected official next door

    Open Access•Daniel B Jones, Randall Walsh et al.•ARTICLE•Regional Science and Urban…•2025

  • Mayors’ promotion incentives and subnational-level GDP manipulation

    Open Access•Jiangnan Zeng, Qiyao Zhou•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 34

    What role do local officials’ incentives play in regional economic growth? How do local officials behave under promotion pressure? This paper studies the unintended impact of mayors’ promotion incentives on regional economic growth and subnational-level GDP manipulation in China. We employ a regression discontinuity design that accounts for age restrictions in deciding promotions for mayors. We find that when GDP performance is prioritized in off…

  • Mayors’ promotion incentives and subnational-level GDP manipulation

    Open Access•Jiangnan Zeng, Qiyao Zhou•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 34

    What role do local officials’ incentives play in regional economic growth? How do local officials behave under promotion pressure? This paper studies the unintended impact of mayors’ promotion incentives on regional economic growth and subnational-level GDP manipulation in China. We employ a regression discontinuity design that accounts for age restrictions in deciding promotions for mayors. We find that when GDP performance is prioritized in off…

  • Mayors’ promotion incentives and subnational-level GDP manipulation

    Open Access•Jiangnan Zeng, Qiyao Zhou•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 34

    What role do local officials’ incentives play in regional economic growth? How do local officials behave under promotion pressure? This paper studies the unintended impact of mayors’ promotion incentives on regional economic growth and subnational-level GDP manipulation in China. We employ a regression discontinuity design that accounts for age restrictions in deciding promotions for mayors. We find that when GDP performance is prioritized in off…

  • The elected official next door

    Open Access•Daniel B Jones, Randall Walsh et al.•ARTICLE•Regional Science and Urban…•2025

Business (2 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (2 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (1 work) · Incentive (1 work) · Income, Poverty, and Inequality (1 work) · Microeconomics (1 work) · Political science (1 work)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae