Brendan Rittenhouse Green
Biographic Data
| ID | 6154166 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brendan Rittenhouse Green |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brendan Rittenhouse |
| FAMILY NAME | Green |
| SIGNATURE | GREEN B R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Brendan Rittenhouse Green is the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan
The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of reunification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines du…
Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition
International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then ad…
The Limits of Damage Limitation
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage …
Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy
Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to …
Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy
October 01 2013 Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy Campbell Craig, Campbell Craig Campbell Craig is Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, and coauthor, with Fredrik Logevall, of America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. The author is grateful to Jan Ruzicka and Benoît Pelopidas for their many comments and suggestions. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Ben…
Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition
Contrary to conventional accounts, the United States did not immediately adopt a set of sweeping commitments to Europe after World War II. Instead, it pursued a buck-passing strategy until the early 1960s that sought to craft Western Europe into an independent pole of power capable of balancing the Soviet Union largely without the assistance of the United States, thereby facilitating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the continent. Only under Pr…
Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy
Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to …
Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition
Contrary to conventional accounts, the United States did not immediately adopt a set of sweeping commitments to Europe after World War II. Instead, it pursued a buck-passing strategy until the early 1960s that sought to craft Western Europe into an independent pole of power capable of balancing the Soviet Union largely without the assistance of the United States, thereby facilitating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the continent. Only under Pr…
Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan
The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of reunification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines du…
Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition
International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then ad…
Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy
October 01 2013 Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy Campbell Craig, Campbell Craig Campbell Craig is Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, and coauthor, with Fredrik Logevall, of America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. The author is grateful to Jan Ruzicka and Benoît Pelopidas for their many comments and suggestions. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Ben…
The Limits of Damage Limitation
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage …
Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition
Contrary to conventional accounts, the United States did not immediately adopt a set of sweeping commitments to Europe after World War II. Instead, it pursued a buck-passing strategy until the early 1960s that sought to craft Western Europe into an independent pole of power capable of balancing the Soviet Union largely without the assistance of the United States, thereby facilitating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the continent. Only under Pr…
Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy
October 01 2013 Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy Campbell Craig, Campbell Craig Campbell Craig is Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, and coauthor, with Fredrik Logevall, of America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. The author is grateful to Jan Ruzicka and Benoît Pelopidas for their many comments and suggestions. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Ben…
Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy
Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to …
The Limits of Damage Limitation
Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few benefits while incurring serious costs.1 In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damage-limitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage …
Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition
International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then ad…
Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan
The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of reunification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines du…
Political science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (4 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works)