Rachel Fredericks
Biographic Data
| ID | 6210904 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rachel Fredericks |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rachel |
| FAMILY NAME | Fredericks |
| SIGNATURE | FREDERICKS R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies Ball State University Muncie IN USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4622-0554 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Caregivers, Kids, and Carnist Structural Injustice
Numerous arguments concerning harms to animals, the environment, and children plausibly establish a defeasible moral duty to avoid training and encouraging kids to regularly eat animal products – practices we call ‘carnist caregiving’. Yet existing social structures make avoiding carnist caregiving unreasonably difficult or unthinkable for many caregivers. We argue that these caregivers are unjustly induced and/or pressured into carnist caregivin…
Climate Legacy
Individual and collective agents, especially affluent ones, are not doing nearly enough to prevent and prepare for the worst consequences of the unfolding climate crisis. This is, I suggest, partly because our existing conceptual repertoires are inadequate to the task of motivating climate-stabilizing activities. I argue that the concept CLIMATE LEGACY meets five desiderata for concepts that, through usage, have significant potential to motivate …
The Creeps as a Moral Emotion
Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps …
Moral responsibility for concepts, continued
In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can be morally responsible for our concepts if they are mental representations. Here, I make a complementary argument for the claim that even if concepts are abstract objects, we can be morally responsible for coming to grasp and for thinking (or not thinking) in terms of them. As before, I take for granted Angela Smith's (2005) rational relations account of moral responsibility, though I think the same con…
Moral responsibility for concepts
I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes…
When Wanting the Best Is Bad
Here I call attention to a class of desires that I call exclusionary desires. To have an exclusionary desire is to desire something under a description such that, were the desire satisfied, it would be logically impossible for people other than the desiring subject to possess the desired object. Assuming that we are morally responsible for our desires insofar as and because they reflect our evaluative judgments and are in principle subject to rat…
Courage as an Environmental Virtue
No prominent works on this page.
Courage as an Environmental Virtue
Moral responsibility for concepts
I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes…
When Wanting the Best Is Bad
Here I call attention to a class of desires that I call exclusionary desires. To have an exclusionary desire is to desire something under a description such that, were the desire satisfied, it would be logically impossible for people other than the desiring subject to possess the desired object. Assuming that we are morally responsible for our desires insofar as and because they reflect our evaluative judgments and are in principle subject to rat…
The Creeps as a Moral Emotion
Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps …
Moral responsibility for concepts, continued
In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can be morally responsible for our concepts if they are mental representations. Here, I make a complementary argument for the claim that even if concepts are abstract objects, we can be morally responsible for coming to grasp and for thinking (or not thinking) in terms of them. As before, I take for granted Angela Smith's (2005) rational relations account of moral responsibility, though I think the same con…
Climate Legacy
Individual and collective agents, especially affluent ones, are not doing nearly enough to prevent and prepare for the worst consequences of the unfolding climate crisis. This is, I suggest, partly because our existing conceptual repertoires are inadequate to the task of motivating climate-stabilizing activities. I argue that the concept CLIMATE LEGACY meets five desiderata for concepts that, through usage, have significant potential to motivate …
Caregivers, Kids, and Carnist Structural Injustice
Numerous arguments concerning harms to animals, the environment, and children plausibly establish a defeasible moral duty to avoid training and encouraging kids to regularly eat animal products – practices we call ‘carnist caregiving’. Yet existing social structures make avoiding carnist caregiving unreasonably difficult or unthinkable for many caregivers. We argue that these caregivers are unjustly induced and/or pressured into carnist caregivin…
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Moral responsibility (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works)