Vasile Visoțchi
Biographic Data
| ID | 6213373 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vasile Visoțchi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vasile |
| FAMILY NAME | Visoțchi |
| SIGNATURE | VISOȚCHI V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bucharest |
| ORCID | 0009-0001-0858-8713 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Towards a Phenomenological Understanding of Disembodiment in Schizophrenia
The aim of this paper is to analyse the experience of disembodiment in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. Given that disembodiment is characterized by a diminished sense of body ownership, it is usually interpreted in a Cartesian manner as involving a mind-body dichotomy. Contrary to this view, firstly, I argue that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically untenable, because it is incompatible with experiencing one’s alien…
Mistrust in the World
Recent phenomenological research on limit-experiences has witnessed an increasing interest in the idea of “basic trust,” commonly interpreted in light of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “perceptual faith”. However, I argue that basic trust is not reducible to perceptual faith, insofar as losing one’s perceptual grip on the world completely obstructs one’s access to the world. Instead, I propose an interpretation of basic trust in accordance with Heideg…
No prominent works on this page.
Mistrust in the World
Recent phenomenological research on limit-experiences has witnessed an increasing interest in the idea of “basic trust,” commonly interpreted in light of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “perceptual faith”. However, I argue that basic trust is not reducible to perceptual faith, insofar as losing one’s perceptual grip on the world completely obstructs one’s access to the world. Instead, I propose an interpretation of basic trust in accordance with Heideg…
Towards a Phenomenological Understanding of Disembodiment in Schizophrenia
The aim of this paper is to analyse the experience of disembodiment in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. Given that disembodiment is characterized by a diminished sense of body ownership, it is usually interpreted in a Cartesian manner as involving a mind-body dichotomy. Contrary to this view, firstly, I argue that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically untenable, because it is incompatible with experiencing one’s alien…
Modern philosophy (2 works) · Alienation (1 work) · Defamiliarization (1 work) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (1 work) · Embodied cognition (1 work) · Faith (1 work) · Interpretation (philosophy (1 work) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (1 work) · Perception (1 work) · Phenomenology (philosophy (1 work)