Stéphane Mussard
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219110 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stéphane Mussard |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stéphane |
| FAMILY NAME | Mussard |
| SIGNATURE | MUSSARD S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2331-630X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Linear-efficient-symmetric values and inequality in TU-games
This paper introduces a dominance criterion that determines whether a TU-game is less unequal than another. A game is derived from another by non-void sequences of inequality-reducing transfers of worth between coalitions of equal size if and only if the resulting game is less unequal in the Lorenz sense. The paper also measures payoff inequality among players (for a TU-game) through the Lorenz criterion. When a distribution (allocation) of payof…
How information technology contributes to justice efficiency
This paper explores how information technology (IT) contributes to judicial efficiency, that is, to what extent investment in IT helps shorten court delays. It uses information collected by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), a body of the Council of Europe, from the ministries of justice of 16 of its member countries. A part of this survey, conducted every two years by the CEPEJ, focuses on the judicial services inform…
Atkinson–Shapley rules for TU-games
Utility and income transfer principles
Income inequality games
Income inequality games
Utility and income transfer principles
How information technology contributes to justice efficiency
This paper explores how information technology (IT) contributes to judicial efficiency, that is, to what extent investment in IT helps shorten court delays. It uses information collected by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), a body of the Council of Europe, from the ministries of justice of 16 of its member countries. A part of this survey, conducted every two years by the CEPEJ, focuses on the judicial services inform…
Atkinson–Shapley rules for TU-games
Linear-efficient-symmetric values and inequality in TU-games
This paper introduces a dominance criterion that determines whether a TU-game is less unequal than another. A game is derived from another by non-void sequences of inequality-reducing transfers of worth between coalitions of equal size if and only if the resulting game is less unequal in the Lorenz sense. The paper also measures payoff inequality among players (for a TU-game) through the Lorenz criterion. When a distribution (allocation) of payof…
Economic theories and models (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Income, Poverty, and Inequality (2 works) · Inequality (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)