Bhaskar Dutta
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219199 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bhaskar Dutta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bhaskar |
| FAMILY NAME | Dutta |
| SIGNATURE | DUTTA B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indian Statistical Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6272-3974 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 127 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Strategic hiding and exploration in networks
Strategic hiding and exploration in networks
Attack and interception in networks
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker—a compar…
Selecting a winner with external referees
A game of hide and seek in networks
Efficient partnership formation in networks
We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players esse…
Multidimensional Poverty
A rich literature on multidimensional poverty measurement has recently sprung up. In this multidimensional setting, an individual is identified as poor or deprived if he or she falls short of these poverty-line-like cut-offs along various dimensions. A key assumption is that these shortfalls are non-comparable—a shortfall in one dimension cannot be compensated by a gain in another. This chapter reviews some of these axiomatic treatments and quest…
Child labor and household wealth
Electoral goals and center-state transfers
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election
Potential maximizers and network formation
Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal‐agent relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of sacking or contract termination will be equilibrium outcomes.
Exact choice and fuzzy preferences
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
Individual strategy and manipulation of issues
Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
Individual strategy and manipulation of issues
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
Exact choice and fuzzy preferences
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal‐agent relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of sacking or contract termination will be equilibrium outcomes.
Potential maximizers and network formation
Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
Electoral goals and center-state transfers
Child labor and household wealth
Multidimensional Poverty
A rich literature on multidimensional poverty measurement has recently sprung up. In this multidimensional setting, an individual is identified as poor or deprived if he or she falls short of these poverty-line-like cut-offs along various dimensions. A key assumption is that these shortfalls are non-comparable—a shortfall in one dimension cannot be compensated by a gain in another. This chapter reviews some of these axiomatic treatments and quest…
Efficient partnership formation in networks
We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players esse…
A game of hide and seek in networks
Attack and interception in networks
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker—a compar…
Selecting a winner with external referees
Strategic hiding and exploration in networks
Strategic hiding and exploration in networks
Computer Science (12 works) · Economics (12 works) · Game Theory and Applications (11 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (9 works) · Mathematical economics (9 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works)