Josep M Izquierdo
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219272 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Josep M Izquierdo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Josep M |
| FAMILY NAME | Izquierdo |
| SIGNATURE | IZQUIERDO J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4104-9604 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Egalitarian-in-deviation rules relative to a reference system for resolving conflicting claims problems
We study claims problems in which agents may also have reference points. We show first that many classical rules satisfy an egalitarian property in this setting; namely, the differences between each agents’ payoff and the corresponding reference value are as equal as possible. We also introduce a broad class of rules that satisfy a generalized condition, dubbed egalitarian-in-deviation relative to a reference system. For each problem, the system …
Claims manipulations discriminate between egalitarian rules
Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) and proves that every assignment game with at least two sellers and two buyers, where each buyer-seller pair derives a positive gain from trade, lacks a PMAS. In particular glove games lacks PMAS. We propose a new cooperative TU-game concept, population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes (PLMAS), which relaxes some population monotonicity condit…
Core Allocations in Co-investment Problems
Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions
Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions
Core Allocations in Co-investment Problems
Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) and proves that every assignment game with at least two sellers and two buyers, where each buyer-seller pair derives a positive gain from trade, lacks a PMAS. In particular glove games lacks PMAS. We propose a new cooperative TU-game concept, population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes (PLMAS), which relaxes some population monotonicity condit…
Claims manipulations discriminate between egalitarian rules
Egalitarian-in-deviation rules relative to a reference system for resolving conflicting claims problems
We study claims problems in which agents may also have reference points. We show first that many classical rules satisfy an egalitarian property in this setting; namely, the differences between each agents’ payoff and the corresponding reference value are as equal as possible. We also introduce a broad class of rules that satisfy a generalized condition, dubbed egalitarian-in-deviation relative to a reference system. For each problem, the system …
Game Theory and Voting Systems (6 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Mathematical optimization (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)