Ronald Peeters
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219318 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ronald Peeters |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ronald |
| FAMILY NAME | Peeters |
| SIGNATURE | PEETERS R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Otago |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5261-1119 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Social preferences and expected utility
It is well known that ex-ante social preferences and expected utility are not always compatible. In this note, we introduce a novel framework that naturally separates social preferences from selfish preferences to answer the following question: What specific forms of social preferences can be accommodated within the expected utility paradigm? In a departure from existing frameworks, our framework shows that ex-ante social preferences can be recon…
Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games
A connection between von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and symmetric potential games
This paper establishes a previously unexplored connection between expected utility theory and potential games. Starting with a decision problem with a complete preference relation over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives, we construct a two-person symmetric game using a payoff function that represents the preference relation, and show that if the preference relation satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility axioms then the cons…
Cost-(in)effective public good provision
This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as indiv…
Stable cartel configurations and product differentiation
We develop a framework to analyse stable cartelisation when firms can form multiple cartels. This contrasts with the existing literature which generally assumes, without further justification, that at most one cartel may form. We define cartelisation to be stable in the multiple cartels framework if: (i) a firm in a cartel does not find it more profitable to leave the cartel and operate independently, (ii) a firm that operates independently does …
Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
We consider the intertemporal price discrimination problem of a durable good monopolist facing a population of consumers who are time inconsistent. We show that price trajectories, profits and welfare are sensitive to consumers’ first- and second-order beliefs regarding their time preferences. Surprisingly, we find that sales and profits are largest when consumers are sophisticated, i.e., when consumers hold correct expectations on their own futu…
Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests
We consider a proportional-prize contest to forecast future events, and show that, in equilibrium, this mechanism possesses perfect forecasting ability for any group size when the contestants share common knowledge about the probabilities by which future events realize. Data gathered in a laboratory experiment confirm the performance invariance to group size. By contrast, when realization probabilities are not common knowledge, there are some dif…
Simple guilt and cooperation
Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
Simple guilt and cooperation
Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests
We consider a proportional-prize contest to forecast future events, and show that, in equilibrium, this mechanism possesses perfect forecasting ability for any group size when the contestants share common knowledge about the probabilities by which future events realize. Data gathered in a laboratory experiment confirm the performance invariance to group size. By contrast, when realization probabilities are not common knowledge, there are some dif…
Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
We consider the intertemporal price discrimination problem of a durable good monopolist facing a population of consumers who are time inconsistent. We show that price trajectories, profits and welfare are sensitive to consumers’ first- and second-order beliefs regarding their time preferences. Surprisingly, we find that sales and profits are largest when consumers are sophisticated, i.e., when consumers hold correct expectations on their own futu…
A connection between von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and symmetric potential games
This paper establishes a previously unexplored connection between expected utility theory and potential games. Starting with a decision problem with a complete preference relation over lotteries on a finite set of alternatives, we construct a two-person symmetric game using a payoff function that represents the preference relation, and show that if the preference relation satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility axioms then the cons…
Cost-(in)effective public good provision
This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as indiv…
Stable cartel configurations and product differentiation
We develop a framework to analyse stable cartelisation when firms can form multiple cartels. This contrasts with the existing literature which generally assumes, without further justification, that at most one cartel may form. We define cartelisation to be stable in the multiple cartels framework if: (i) a firm in a cartel does not find it more profitable to leave the cartel and operate independently, (ii) a firm that operates independently does …
Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games
Social preferences and expected utility
It is well known that ex-ante social preferences and expected utility are not always compatible. In this note, we introduce a novel framework that naturally separates social preferences from selfish preferences to answer the following question: What specific forms of social preferences can be accommodated within the expected utility paradigm? In a departure from existing frameworks, our framework shows that ex-ante social preferences can be recon…
Economics (6 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (4 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game theory (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works)