Bertrand Tchantcho
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219396 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bertrand Tchantcho |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bertrand |
| FAMILY NAME | Tchantcho |
| SIGNATURE | TCHANTCHO B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5185-524X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Consistent desirability relation in games with multiple levels of approval and achievable hierarchies
The stability of multi-dimensional rules
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices
A core of voting games with improved foresight
Pouvoir mesuré et capacité d'un électeur à influencer le résultat du vote
We study the power relation ≥ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylor’s influence relation ≥ T appraises the voter’s capacity of influencing the voting outcome when individual preference relations are linear orders, if the classical dominance stands for the social outcome and the Kendal’s distance is the means of measuring a voter’s dissatisfaction. In this paper, the definition…
Pouvoir mesuré et capacité d'un électeur à influencer le résultat du vote
We study the power relation ≥ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylor’s influence relation ≥ T appraises the voter’s capacity of influencing the voting outcome when individual preference relations are linear orders, if the classical dominance stands for the social outcome and the Kendal’s distance is the means of measuring a voter’s dissatisfaction. In this paper, the definition…
A core of voting games with improved foresight
Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
Consistent desirability relation in games with multiple levels of approval and achievable hierarchies
The stability of multi-dimensional rules
Game Theory and Voting Systems (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Political science (4 works) · Voting (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)