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Oriol Tejada

Biographic Data

ID6219461
NAMEOriol Tejada
GIVEN NAMESOriol
FAMILY NAMETejada
SIGNATURETEJADA O
AFFILIATIONSETH Zurich
ORCID0000-0002-4819-0259
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS0
WORKS AS AUTHOR7
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX0
  • Direct or representative democracy? Co-Voting

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2026•References: 61

  • Optimal democratic mechanisms

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Stephan Imhof et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

    Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i) there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii) a member of the minority propos…

  • Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Oriol Tejada•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2024

    We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative…

  • Lemons and peaches

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2022•References: 44

    We introduce a four-stage, multi-price buying mechanism which can be used by a (big) buyer to separate low-quality sellers – called “lemon” owners – from high-quality sellers – called “peach” owners. With a partition of sellers into several groups, the buyer obtains the commodities from a desired number of “peach” owners at a price that matches their willingness to sell. For their part, “lemon” owners are trapped into selling their items at a low…

  • Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games

    Open Access•Oriol Tejada, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2018•References: 21

  • A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations

    Open Access•Oriol Tejada, Peter Borm et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2014•References: 8

  • A Differential Redistributive Analysis of Bilinear Dual-Income-Tax Reforms

    Samuel Calonge, Oriol Tejada•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2011

    We analyze differential redistributive effects of bilinear tax reforms that are applied to dual income taxes or, more generally, to two different one-dimensional taxes. To do so we analyze the one-dimensional income tax case, and then we introduce a partial order, based on the Lorenz dominance criterion, which induces a lattice structure within the set of bilinear tax reforms whenever certain conditions on the tax reform policies and the dual inc…

No prominent works on this page.

  • A Differential Redistributive Analysis of Bilinear Dual-Income-Tax Reforms

    Samuel Calonge, Oriol Tejada•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2011

    We analyze differential redistributive effects of bilinear tax reforms that are applied to dual income taxes or, more generally, to two different one-dimensional taxes. To do so we analyze the one-dimensional income tax case, and then we introduce a partial order, based on the Lorenz dominance criterion, which induces a lattice structure within the set of bilinear tax reforms whenever certain conditions on the tax reform policies and the dual inc…

  • A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations

    Open Access•Oriol Tejada, Peter Borm et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2014•References: 8

  • Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games

    Open Access•Oriol Tejada, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2018•References: 21

  • Lemons and peaches

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2022•References: 44

    We introduce a four-stage, multi-price buying mechanism which can be used by a (big) buyer to separate low-quality sellers – called “lemon” owners – from high-quality sellers – called “peach” owners. With a partition of sellers into several groups, the buyer obtains the commodities from a desired number of “peach” owners at a price that matches their willingness to sell. For their part, “lemon” owners are trapped into selling their items at a low…

  • Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Oriol Tejada•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2024

    We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative…

  • Optimal democratic mechanisms

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Stephan Imhof et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

    Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i) there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii) a member of the minority propos…

  • Direct or representative democracy? Co-Voting

    Open Access•Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2026•References: 61

Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Combinatorics (2 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Game theory (2 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae