Oriol Tejada
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219461 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oriol Tejada |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oriol |
| FAMILY NAME | Tejada |
| SIGNATURE | TEJADA O |
| AFFILIATIONS | ETH Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4819-0259 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Direct or representative democracy? Co-Voting
Optimal democratic mechanisms
Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i) there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii) a member of the minority propos…
Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative…
Lemons and peaches
We introduce a four-stage, multi-price buying mechanism which can be used by a (big) buyer to separate low-quality sellers – called “lemon” owners – from high-quality sellers – called “peach” owners. With a partition of sellers into several groups, the buyer obtains the commodities from a desired number of “peach” owners at a price that matches their willingness to sell. For their part, “lemon” owners are trapped into selling their items at a low…
Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games
A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations
A Differential Redistributive Analysis of Bilinear Dual-Income-Tax Reforms
We analyze differential redistributive effects of bilinear tax reforms that are applied to dual income taxes or, more generally, to two different one-dimensional taxes. To do so we analyze the one-dimensional income tax case, and then we introduce a partial order, based on the Lorenz dominance criterion, which induces a lattice structure within the set of bilinear tax reforms whenever certain conditions on the tax reform policies and the dual inc…
No prominent works on this page.
A Differential Redistributive Analysis of Bilinear Dual-Income-Tax Reforms
We analyze differential redistributive effects of bilinear tax reforms that are applied to dual income taxes or, more generally, to two different one-dimensional taxes. To do so we analyze the one-dimensional income tax case, and then we introduce a partial order, based on the Lorenz dominance criterion, which induces a lattice structure within the set of bilinear tax reforms whenever certain conditions on the tax reform policies and the dual inc…
A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations
Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games
Lemons and peaches
We introduce a four-stage, multi-price buying mechanism which can be used by a (big) buyer to separate low-quality sellers – called “lemon” owners – from high-quality sellers – called “peach” owners. With a partition of sellers into several groups, the buyer obtains the commodities from a desired number of “peach” owners at a price that matches their willingness to sell. For their part, “lemon” owners are trapped into selling their items at a low…
Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the vote-share thresholds used in every round of binary voting (a) vary with the alternative on the table for a public-good level and (b) require a qualified majority for approving the alternative…
Optimal democratic mechanisms
Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i) there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii) a member of the minority propos…
Direct or representative democracy? Co-Voting
Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Combinatorics (2 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Game theory (2 works)