Yasunori Okumura
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219598 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yasunori Okumura |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yasunori |
| FAMILY NAME | Okumura |
| SIGNATURE | OKUMURA Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0170-7502 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Respecting linear orders for supermajority rules
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences into a collective ranking without ties (a linear order) over a finite set of alternatives. We introduce a framework that constructs such rankings from supermajority rules, defined by a threshold parameter $$\alpha \in \left[ 1/2,1\right) $$ . For each $$\alpha $$ , we consider the binary relation of defeats from pairwise comparisons and apply two closure operations—the transitive closure …
Aggregating incomplete rankings
Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
Strategic Location Choice and Network Formation for Entry
In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires mutual consent, the entrant has an incentive to choose a noncentral location to collaborate with incumbents and facilitate its entry. Second, the existing c…
A network formation process converges to the complete collaboration network
No prominent works on this page.
A network formation process converges to the complete collaboration network
Strategic Location Choice and Network Formation for Entry
In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires mutual consent, the entrant has an incentive to choose a noncentral location to collaborate with incumbents and facilitate its entry. Second, the existing c…
Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
Aggregating incomplete rankings
Respecting linear orders for supermajority rules
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences into a collective ranking without ties (a linear order) over a finite set of alternatives. We introduce a framework that constructs such rankings from supermajority rules, defined by a threshold parameter $$\alpha \in \left[ 1/2,1\right) $$ . For each $$\alpha $$ , we consider the binary relation of defeats from pairwise comparisons and apply two closure operations—the transitive closure …
Computer Science (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Condorcet method (2 works) · Anti-plurality voting (1 work) · Approval voting (1 work)