Robert C Powers
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219600 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert C Powers |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert C |
| FAMILY NAME | Powers |
| SIGNATURE | POWERS R C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, U.S.A. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
This paper considers voting rules for two alternatives, viz. the simple majority rule of K.O. May, the majority rule with bias of Fishburn and others, and the majority rule by difference of votes of Goodin and List, and of Llamazares. These all have been characterized axiomatically for profiles of fixed length, that is, for a fixed population. The aim of this paper is to study analogs of these results in the situation where various populations ar…
Beyond neutrality
Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
Consensus rules based on decisive families
Removal independent consensus methods for closed -systems of sets
Removal independence and multi-consensus functions
This analysis is aimed to study Buffon's contributions towards political arithmetic, considered not from the point of view of the historical and technical constitution of demography but by replacing them in the general proposal which commands Buffon's thought. The task for assign to these works their real meaning allows not only to understand the disparity of the judgements they raised up but to enlighten too some of the difficulties they conceal…
Further results on neutral consensus functions
We use a set theoretic approach to consensus by viewing an object as a set of smaller pieces called "bricks". A consensus function is neutral if there exists a family D of sets such that a brick s is in the output of a profile if and only if the set of positions with objects that contain s belongs to D. We give sufficient set theoretic conditions for D to be a lattice filter and, in the case of a finite lattice, these conditions turn out to be ne…
Neutral consensus functions
Neutral consensus functions
Further results on neutral consensus functions
We use a set theoretic approach to consensus by viewing an object as a set of smaller pieces called "bricks". A consensus function is neutral if there exists a family D of sets such that a brick s is in the output of a profile if and only if the set of positions with objects that contain s belongs to D. We give sufficient set theoretic conditions for D to be a lattice filter and, in the case of a finite lattice, these conditions turn out to be ne…
Removal independence and multi-consensus functions
This analysis is aimed to study Buffon's contributions towards political arithmetic, considered not from the point of view of the historical and technical constitution of demography but by replacing them in the general proposal which commands Buffon's thought. The task for assign to these works their real meaning allows not only to understand the disparity of the judgements they raised up but to enlighten too some of the difficulties they conceal…
Consensus rules based on decisive families
Removal independent consensus methods for closed -systems of sets
Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
Beyond neutrality
Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
This paper considers voting rules for two alternatives, viz. the simple majority rule of K.O. May, the majority rule with bias of Fishburn and others, and the majority rule by difference of votes of Goodin and List, and of Llamazares. These all have been characterized axiomatically for profiles of fixed length, that is, for a fixed population. The aim of this paper is to study analogs of these results in the situation where various populations ar…
Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
Mathematics (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (8 works) · Mathematical economics (8 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Anonymity (4 works) · Combinatorics (4 works) · Discrete mathematics (4 works) · Class (philosophy (3 works)