Keizo Mizuno
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219760 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Keizo Mizuno |
| GIVEN NAMES | Keizo |
| FAMILY NAME | Mizuno |
| SIGNATURE | MIZUNO K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kwansei Gakuin University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Strategic Location Choice and Network Formation for Entry
In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires mutual consent, the entrant has an incentive to choose a noncentral location to collaborate with incumbents and facilitate its entry. Second, the existing c…
Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities
Gradual Network Expansion and Universal Service Obligations
Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the im…
Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services
We examine an incentive transfer scheme in an executive agency system when there are both marketable and nonmarketable public services. We show that because of the incentive transfer scheme, which contributes to the elimination of a government's budget deficit, social welfare is higher in the executive agency system than in a traditional system when the shadow cost of public funds is large. In addition, the scheme is desirable from a welfare view…
No prominent works on this page.
Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services
We examine an incentive transfer scheme in an executive agency system when there are both marketable and nonmarketable public services. We show that because of the incentive transfer scheme, which contributes to the elimination of a government's budget deficit, social welfare is higher in the executive agency system than in a traditional system when the shadow cost of public funds is large. In addition, the scheme is desirable from a welfare view…
Gradual Network Expansion and Universal Service Obligations
Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the im…
Managerial incentives and endogenous coalition formation with externalities
Strategic Location Choice and Network Formation for Entry
In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires mutual consent, the entrant has an incentive to choose a noncentral location to collaborate with incumbents and facilitate its entry. Second, the existing c…
Business (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Competition (biology (1 work) · Connection (principal bundle (1 work)