Marilda Sotomayor
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219775 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marilda Sotomayor |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marilda |
| FAMILY NAME | Sotomayor |
| SIGNATURE | SOTOMAYOR M |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf
Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Multi-Item Auctions
A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degr…
Multi-Item Auctions
A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degr…
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Multi-Item Auctions
A collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item. Assuming that the bidders place some monetary value on each of the items, it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidders. In this paper we describe two dynamic auction mechanisms: one achieves this equilibrium and the other approximates it to any desired degr…
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems
Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Core (optical fiber (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Matching (statistics (3 works) · Mathematical optimization (3 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works)