Joël Moulen
Biographic Data
| ID | 6219814 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joël Moulen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joël |
| FAMILY NAME | Moulen |
| SIGNATURE | MOULEN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | CREAM, Université de Yaoundé I, Cameroun |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A core of voting games with improved foresight
Pouvoir mesuré et capacité d'un électeur à influencer le résultat du vote
We study the power relation ≥ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylor’s influence relation ≥ T appraises the voter’s capacity of influencing the voting outcome when individual preference relations are linear orders, if the classical dominance stands for the social outcome and the Kendal’s distance is the means of measuring a voter’s dissatisfaction. In this paper, the definition…
Preference aggregation, collective choice and generalized binary constitutions
The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution (GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979), which generalizes some classical notions such as simple games and voting games. The GBC helps us to define a preference aggregation rule (PAR) and we characterize GBC's whose collective preferences are either complete, asymmetric, transitive or acyclic when individual preferences are weak orders or li…
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote
Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much empowered they are. In this paper, we are focused on the true nature of the power modelled by these concepts. We take that true power must traduce the voter's cap…
Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote
Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much empowered they are. In this paper, we are focused on the true nature of the power modelled by these concepts. We take that true power must traduce the voter's cap…
Preference aggregation, collective choice and generalized binary constitutions
The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution (GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979), which generalizes some classical notions such as simple games and voting games. The GBC helps us to define a preference aggregation rule (PAR) and we characterize GBC's whose collective preferences are either complete, asymmetric, transitive or acyclic when individual preferences are weak orders or li…
Pouvoir mesuré et capacité d'un électeur à influencer le résultat du vote
We study the power relation ≥ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylor’s influence relation ≥ T appraises the voter’s capacity of influencing the voting outcome when individual preference relations are linear orders, if the classical dominance stands for the social outcome and the Kendal’s distance is the means of measuring a voter’s dissatisfaction. In this paper, the definition…
A core of voting games with improved foresight
Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Mathematical economics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Voting (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Cardinal voting systems (2 works)