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Isa Hafalir

Biographic Data

ID6220165
NAMEIsa Hafalir
GIVEN NAMESIsa
FAMILY NAMEHafalir
SIGNATUREHAFALIR I
AFFILIATIONSCarnegie Mellon University
ORCID0000-0002-6731-2848
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2016
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • The Efficiency of Moral Character

    Open Access•Gordon Menzies, Isa Hafalir et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Business Ethics•2026

    This paper reconsiders how intrinsic motives that support trustworthiness should be modelled within economic theory, contributing to a methodologically pluralist business ethics. We re-examine the principal–agent problem, exposing a hidden assumption in the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) solution. By introducing a lying cost—reflecting the agent’s concern for honesty—we reveal their model as a limiting case and distinguish between opportunist…

  • Optimal top- n policy

    Open Access•Isa Hafalir, Siqi Pan et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2025•References: 33

  • Matching with aggregate externalities

    Open Access•James Fisher, James C D Fisher et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2016•Cited by: 1•References: 16

  • Matching with aggregate externalities

    Open Access•James Fisher, James C D Fisher et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2016•Cited by: 1•References: 16

  • Matching with aggregate externalities

    Open Access•James Fisher, James C D Fisher et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2016•Cited by: 1•References: 16

  • Optimal top- n policy

    Open Access•Isa Hafalir, Siqi Pan et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2025•References: 33

  • The Efficiency of Moral Character

    Open Access•Gordon Menzies, Isa Hafalir et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Business Ethics•2026

    This paper reconsiders how intrinsic motives that support trustworthiness should be modelled within economic theory, contributing to a methodologically pluralist business ethics. We re-examine the principal–agent problem, exposing a hidden assumption in the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) solution. By introducing a lying cost—reflecting the agent’s concern for honesty—we reveal their model as a limiting case and distinguish between opportunist…

Computer Science (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Aggregate (composite (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Business ethics (1 work) · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs (1 work) · Distrust (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work) · Economics (1 work)

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