Josué Ortega
Biographic Data
| ID | 6220224 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Josué Ortega |
| GIVEN NAMES | Josué |
| FAMILY NAME | Ortega |
| SIGNATURE | ORTEGA J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Queen's University Belfast |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5080-2058 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets
We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting–outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature–this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium wh…
Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
In the classical cake-cutting problem, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for $$n=2$$ n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for $$n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 it implies that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril (J Econ Theory 185:104970, 2019) is compatible with the fairness property of proportionality, which guarantees that each agent…
Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
No prominent works on this page.
Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
In the classical cake-cutting problem, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for $$n=2$$ n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for $$n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 it implies that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril (J Econ Theory 185:104970, 2019) is compatible with the fairness property of proportionality, which guarantees that each agent…
A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets
We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting–outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature–this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium wh…
Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Combinatorics (1 work) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 work) · Disjoint sets (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work)