Nicolas Quérou
Biographic Data
| ID | 6220334 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicolas Quérou |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicolas |
| FAMILY NAME | Quérou |
| SIGNATURE | QUÉROU N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Queen's University Belfast |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9668-1194 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Limited‐tenure concessions for collective goods
Goal-oriented agents in a market
We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and re…
Private eradication of mobile public bads
Partial enclosure of the commons
Pricing in social networks
Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries
Bounded rationality and repeated network formation
Goal-oriented agents in a market
We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and re…
Bounded rationality and repeated network formation
Pricing in social networks
Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries
Partial enclosure of the commons
Private eradication of mobile public bads
Goal-oriented agents in a market
We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and re…
Limited‐tenure concessions for collective goods
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (3 works) · Common-pool resource (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (2 works) · Externality (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works)