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Fangfang Tan

Biographic Data

ID6220918
NAMEFangfang Tan
GIVEN NAMESFangfang
FAMILY NAMETan
SIGNATURETAN F
AFFILIATIONSMax Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
ORCID0000-0001-5961-5198
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS4
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2018
H-INDEX1
  • Third-party punishment

    Open Access•Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2018•Cited by: 3•References: 63

  • Justification and Legitimate Punishment

    Erte Xiao, Fangfang Tan•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2014

    Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most third parties who can profit from punishment punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave. However, when they have to provide explanations for thei…

  • Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

    Open Access•Fangfang Tan, Andrew Yim•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 49

  • Third-party punishment

    Open Access•Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2018•Cited by: 3•References: 63

  • Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

    Open Access•Fangfang Tan, Andrew Yim•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 49

  • Justification and Legitimate Punishment

    Erte Xiao, Fangfang Tan•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2014

    Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most third parties who can profit from punishment punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave. However, when they have to provide explanations for thei…

  • Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

    Open Access•Fangfang Tan, Andrew Yim•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 49

  • Third-party punishment

    Open Access•Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Psychology•2018•Cited by: 3•References: 63

Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Accounting (1 work)

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