Christina E Bannier
Biographic Data
| ID | 6221687 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christina E Bannier |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christina E |
| FAMILY NAME | Bannier |
| SIGNATURE | BANNIER C E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Doing Safe by Doing Good
We compare the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firms' equity risk under two different (non-)financial reporting regimes: the risk-based U.S. and the content-based EU system. We observe a strongly negative CSR-risk relation in the EU, but a much weaker general impact in the U.S. In correspondence with goal-framing theory, we find several moderating effects on this association, depending on the reporting regime: (i) A highly vol…
Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets
We examine the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogeneous firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable payments. When competition is low, low-ability agents are underincentivized, exerting too little effort. When competition is high, high-ability agents are ove…
Gender- and education-related effects of financial literacy and confidence on financial wealth
Is there a Holdup Benefit in Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing?
This paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk and information policy when the firm tries to maximize credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity to credibly signal their desire to abstain from strategic default. This allows the firm's policy to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidation even fo…
Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises
This paper reconsiders a central bank's problem of determining rules for information dissemination and risk-taking behavior that minimize the probability of currency crises. In a global-games approach, we find that optimal transparency is adversely related to prior market beliefs. In countries with pessimistic prior beliefs about economic performance, the central bank should commit to disclosing information with maximal precision. In addition, it…
Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises
This paper reconsiders a central bank's problem of determining rules for information dissemination and risk-taking behavior that minimize the probability of currency crises. In a global-games approach, we find that optimal transparency is adversely related to prior market beliefs. In countries with pessimistic prior beliefs about economic performance, the central bank should commit to disclosing information with maximal precision. In addition, it…
Is there a Holdup Benefit in Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing?
This paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk and information policy when the firm tries to maximize credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity to credibly signal their desire to abstain from strategic default. This allows the firm's policy to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidation even fo…
Gender- and education-related effects of financial literacy and confidence on financial wealth
Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets
We examine the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogeneous firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable payments. When competition is low, low-ability agents are underincentivized, exerting too little effort. When competition is high, high-ability agents are ove…
Doing Safe by Doing Good
We compare the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firms' equity risk under two different (non-)financial reporting regimes: the risk-based U.S. and the content-based EU system. We observe a strongly negative CSR-risk relation in the EU, but a much weaker general impact in the U.S. In correspondence with goal-framing theory, we find several moderating effects on this association, depending on the reporting regime: (i) A highly vol…
Economics (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (2 works) · Accounting (1 work) · Adverse selection (1 work) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (1 work) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work)