Michal Polak
Biographic Data
| ID | 6229221 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michal Polak |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michal |
| FAMILY NAME | Polak |
| SIGNATURE | POLAK M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of West Bohemia |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5061-1534 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality
The paper argues that a coherent strong Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (sPIT) needs to adopt the concept of unconscious phenomenality. sPIT is based on the thesis that phenomenal properties constitute intentional episodes. But if “constitutive” means that without these phenomenal properties, intentional episodes break down, then this poses a serious problem for so-called unconscious intentional occurrent episodes. The dilemma is that sPIT eithe…
Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness
There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distingu…
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour
The traditional Marxian picture of a two-class polarisation seems far removed from today's diverse society. Re-examining the very foundations of the Marxian theory in the process, the author argues th
No prominent works on this page.
Class, Surplus, and the Division of Labour
The traditional Marxian picture of a two-class polarisation seems far removed from today's diverse society. Re-examining the very foundations of the Marxian theory in the process, the author argues th
Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness
There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distingu…
Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality
The paper argues that a coherent strong Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (sPIT) needs to adopt the concept of unconscious phenomenality. sPIT is based on the thesis that phenomenal properties constitute intentional episodes. But if “constitutive” means that without these phenomenal properties, intentional episodes break down, then this poses a serious problem for so-called unconscious intentional occurrent episodes. The dilemma is that sPIT eithe…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Unconscious mind (2 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (1 work) · Arithmetic (1 work) · Class (philosophy) (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)