Greta Roland
Biographic Data
| ID | 629391 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Greta Roland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Greta |
| FAMILY NAME | Roland |
| SIGNATURE | ROLAND G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1403-4351 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 36 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 906 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 36 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 12 |
Empires, Nation-States, and Democracies: Institutions in the International Arena
Cultural distance, firm boundaries, and global sourcing
Shifting Punishment onto Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is h…
Erosion of State Power, Corruption Control and Fiscal Capacity
We model how corruption erodes state power, that is, the state’s ability to keep its apparatus under control in crises. Under a general assumption about fat-tailed risk of crisis, we show that given strong fiscal capacity, the head of the state will control local corruption at such a level that its power is secured; given weaker capacity, the state will over-tolerate corruption to retain officials, risking control in crises; moreover, a state may…
Culture, institutions and democratization
We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and aver…
Identity Politics and Populism in Europe
We review the literature on the rise of identity politics and populism in Europe. Populist parties have gained large vote shares since the Great Recession of 2008. We observe in many countries, and even in the European Parliament, a transformation of the main dimension of politics from the left–right cleavage to a new cleavage opposing the mainstream parties to populist parties. We examine how this transformation relates to changes in voter attit…
Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament
Culture, Institutions, and the Wealth of Nations
We argue that a more individualist culture leads to more innovation and to higher growth because of the social status rewards associated with innovation in that culture. We use data on the frequency of particular genes associated with collectivist cultures, as well as a measure of distance in terms of frequencies of blood types, and historic prevalence of pathogens to instrument individualism scores. The relationship between individualism and inn…
Institutions and Comparative Economic Development
Economics and Culture
We survey recent research on the economic effects of culture. We discuss definition and measures of culture used in research. We highlight the strong inertia of culture, document its effects on institutional change, and discuss other economic effects of culture, such as on innovation and growth.
Economies in Transition
The twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall saw many reflect on the political, economic and social changes of recent years. The legacy of communism and the economic prospects of post-comm
The Long-Run Weight of Communism or the Weight of Long-Run History?
This study provides evidence that culture understood as values and beliefs moves very slowly. Despite massive institutional change, values and beliefs in transition countries have not changed much over the last 20 years. Evidence suggests that culture is
Understanding the Individualism-Collectivism Cleavage and Its Effects: Lessons from Cultural Psychology
The central role of culture on economic development has been recognized at least since Max Weber who, in his classic work ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, argued that the protestant ethic of Calvinism was a very powerful force behind the development of capitalism in its early phases. Recently economic historians such as Landes (1998) and Mokyr (2010) have emphasized the crucial role of culture in explaining the industrial revo…
Which Dimensions of Culture Matter for Long-Run Growth?
We present empirical evidence that, among a variety of cultural dimensions, the individualism-collectivism dimension, based on Hofstede's (2001) data, is the most important and robustly significant effect of culture on long run growth. Other dimensions that have a significant effect, albeit less robust, are generally strongly correlated with individualism and convey similar information. We found no significant or robust effect on growth from cult…
The long-run impact of bombing Vietnam
Corruption, Development and Institutional Design
With the aim of providing a comprehensive analysis of institutions, and of the global economy more generally, this volume explores systems of institutions and the effect of corruption, developments in
Democratic Politics in the European Parliament
With the European Parliament comprising politicians from many different countries, cultures, languages, national parties and institutional backgrounds, one might expect politics in the Parliament to be highly-fragmented and unpredictable. By studying more than 12,000 recorded votes between 1979 and 2004 this 2007 book establishes that the opposite is in fact true: transnational parties in the European Parliament are highly cohesive and the classi…
Entrepreneurship in China and Russia Compared
Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinct…
Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament
We investigate the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament by applying a scaling method to all roll‐call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using these methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the European Union's only elected in…
The Russian Economy in the Year 2005
2006). The Russian Economy in the Year 2005. Post-Soviet Affairs: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 90-98
Entrepreneurship: First Results from Russia
Who are China's Entrepreneurs
Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001
How cohesive are political parties in the European Parliament? What coalitions form and why? The answers to these questions are central for understanding the impact of the European Parliament on European Union policies. These questions are also central in the study of legislative behaviour in general. We collected the total population of roll-call votes in the European Parliament, from the first elections in 1979 to the end of 2001 (over 11,500 v…
Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions
Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001
How cohesive are political parties in the European Parliament? What coalitions form and why? The answers to these questions are central for understanding the impact of the European Parliament on European Union policies. These questions are also central in the study of legislative behaviour in general. We collected the total population of roll-call votes in the European Parliament, from the first elections in 1979 to the end of 2001 (over 11,500 v…
Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament
We investigate the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament by applying a scaling method to all roll‐call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using these methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the European Union's only elected in…
The long-run impact of bombing Vietnam
Identity Politics and Populism in Europe
We review the literature on the rise of identity politics and populism in Europe. Populist parties have gained large vote shares since the Great Recession of 2008. We observe in many countries, and even in the European Parliament, a transformation of the main dimension of politics from the left–right cleavage to a new cleavage opposing the mainstream parties to populist parties. We examine how this transformation relates to changes in voter attit…
Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual‐Track Approach to Transition
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers o…
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary s…
Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions
Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinct…
The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy
FLWNO
The Political Economy of Transition
The overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform. What are the main insights from that theory? How does it reflect the transition reality? What have we learned, and what do we still need to learn? The present article will attempt to answer those questions
Culture, institutions and democratization
We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and aver…
Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament
On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring
Journal Article On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring Get access Gérard Roland Gérard Roland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 104, Issue 426, 1 September 1994, Pages 1158–1168, https://doi.org/10.2307/2235073 Published: 01 September 1994
Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory
The Russian Economy in the Year 2005
2006). The Russian Economy in the Year 2005. Post-Soviet Affairs: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 90-98
Shifting Punishment onto Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is h…
Erosion of State Power, Corruption Control and Fiscal Capacity
We model how corruption erodes state power, that is, the state’s ability to keep its apparatus under control in crises. Under a general assumption about fat-tailed risk of crisis, we show that given strong fiscal capacity, the head of the state will control local corruption at such a level that its power is secured; given weaker capacity, the state will over-tolerate corruption to retain officials, risking control in crises; moreover, a state may…
Cultural distance, firm boundaries, and global sourcing
The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy
FLWNO
A university in the ?Fourth World: The self-determination of the Norwegian Saami
Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of Germany
The unification of Germany is one of the most wrenching and dramatic transitions in economic history. A policy issue of worldwide interest, it holds key lessons for the remaining post-socialist economies. In Jumpstart two well-known German economists synthesize a vast body of literature to present the first well-structured, clearly argued analytical account of the reunification process and the policy alternatives. The Sinns' authoritative and pri…
On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring
Journal Article On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring Get access Gérard Roland Gérard Roland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 104, Issue 426, 1 September 1994, Pages 1158–1168, https://doi.org/10.2307/2235073 Published: 01 September 1994
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the…
The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis
This paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations. In each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting. A basic trade-off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted. The model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies. The main results of the paper are i) when income distributions vary across regions and the effici…
Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory
Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual‐Track Approach to Transition
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual‐track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto‐improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump‐sum transfers to compensate potential losers o…
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary s…
Law enforcement and transition
The Political Economy of Transition
The overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform. What are the main insights from that theory? How does it reflect the transition reality? What have we learned, and what do we still need to learn? The present article will attempt to answer those questions
Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions
Entrepreneurship: First Results from Russia
Who are China's Entrepreneurs
Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001
How cohesive are political parties in the European Parliament? What coalitions form and why? The answers to these questions are central for understanding the impact of the European Parliament on European Union policies. These questions are also central in the study of legislative behaviour in general. We collected the total population of roll-call votes in the European Parliament, from the first elections in 1979 to the end of 2001 (over 11,500 v…
Entrepreneurship in China and Russia Compared
Coordination and Experimentation in M‐Form and U‐Form Organizations
We compare the performance of organizational forms (M-form and U-form) in experimenting with uncertain projects. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination in "attribute matching" but suffers from coordination in "attribute compatibility" and less gains in specialization. The distinct…
Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament
We investigate the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament by applying a scaling method to all roll‐call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using these methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the European Union's only elected in…
The Russian Economy in the Year 2005
2006). The Russian Economy in the Year 2005. Post-Soviet Affairs: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 90-98
Democratic Politics in the European Parliament
With the European Parliament comprising politicians from many different countries, cultures, languages, national parties and institutional backgrounds, one might expect politics in the Parliament to be highly-fragmented and unpredictable. By studying more than 12,000 recorded votes between 1979 and 2004 this 2007 book establishes that the opposite is in fact true: transnational parties in the European Parliament are highly cohesive and the classi…
Corruption, Development and Institutional Design
With the aim of providing a comprehensive analysis of institutions, and of the global economy more generally, this volume explores systems of institutions and the effect of corruption, developments in
The long-run impact of bombing Vietnam
Which Dimensions of Culture Matter for Long-Run Growth?
We present empirical evidence that, among a variety of cultural dimensions, the individualism-collectivism dimension, based on Hofstede's (2001) data, is the most important and robustly significant effect of culture on long run growth. Other dimensions that have a significant effect, albeit less robust, are generally strongly correlated with individualism and convey similar information. We found no significant or robust effect on growth from cult…
Economies in Transition
The twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall saw many reflect on the political, economic and social changes of recent years. The legacy of communism and the economic prospects of post-comm
The Long-Run Weight of Communism or the Weight of Long-Run History?
This study provides evidence that culture understood as values and beliefs moves very slowly. Despite massive institutional change, values and beliefs in transition countries have not changed much over the last 20 years. Evidence suggests that culture is
Political science (31 works) · Economics (27 works) · Law (21 works) · Politics (15 works) · Sociology (12 works) · Political economy (11 works) · Economic system (10 works) · Law (10 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (9 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (6 works)